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Articles
INTERPRETING STALE PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS TO ACQUIRE
REAL ESTATE: BEYOND THE RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY
CARL J. CIRCO*
IMAGINE that the owner of an environmentally sensitive site in a scenictown wants to preserve the land’s natural beauty and protect an impor-
tant aquifer.  The landowner agrees to sell the property to the town at a
price far below its fair market value, subject to a use restriction requiring
that the land be maintained in its natural state.  There is, however, a po-
tential problem: the current owner acquired the site some twenty years
ago under a deed that granted to the prior owner and his children a right
of first refusal to purchase, exercisable whenever the current owner might
decide to sell the property.  Should one of the children, wishing to profit
from the land’s development potential, be able to prevent the proposed
sale or even preempt the sale and acquire the property at the discounted
price?  Does it matter that the prior owner is willing to waive his own first
refusal right?  How long should the objecting child be able to thwart the
proposed sale or acquire the property for development?  Twenty-five
years?  A lifetime?  The lifetime of the last surviving family member plus
twenty-one years?  Longer?
So came about Peters v. Smolian,1 a dispute over a pristine site in the
Town of East Hampton.2  An article in the New York Times reports that the
parties to the original transaction negotiated the right of first refusal to
assure that the property, situated in a forested patch of Long Island’s East
End, could not be resold for development purposes.3  Local celebrities
with ties to the area, including the actor Alec Baldwin, advocated publicly
* Ben J. Altheimer Professor of Legal Advocacy, University of Arkansas
School of Law.  The author thanks his colleague at the University of Arkansas,
Professor Sharon Foster, for her insightful comments on a draft of this article.
1. 12 N.Y.S.3d 824 (Sup. Ct. 2015), aff’d on other grounds, 154 A.D.3d 980 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2017). The opinion on appeal, which was issued as this Article was going
to press, affirmed the trial court’s decision without adding materially to the aspects
of the case discussed in this Article.
2. See id. at 829–31.
3. See Matt A.V. Chaban, In the Hamptons, a Fight over Land Is Also One over
Water, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/25/nyre
(603)
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for the site’s preservation.4  Applying long-standing common law princi-
ples, however, the Smolian court sided with recalcitrant members of the
prior owner’s family, and held that the sale to the town could not pro-
ceed.5  The court hinted that if Smolian family members wished to exer-
cise the preferential purchase right, they might not be bound by the
development restriction agreed to between the town and the landowner.6
Problems like this can arise because preferential rights to purchase
real estate often survive beyond the imaginations of the parties who estab-
lish them.  When a landowner grants a prospective purchaser a long-term,
preferential right to acquire the land, legal disputes may emerge decades
or generations later.  While preferential purchase rights may take several
different forms, including options to purchase and rights of first offer
(ROFOs), some of the most common and intractable disputes involve stale
rights of first refusal (ROFRs).  This Article addresses problems that often
arise as circumstances change over time after contracting parties agree to
a long-term ROFR or other similar rights.7  In particular, drawing on con-
tract interpretation principles already extant, it advocates a more contex-
tual approach that empowers courts to fill in contractual gaps in
preferential rights agreements with terms that are reasonable under the
circumstances.
ROFRs and other preferential purchase rights involve an agreement
by one party, the grantor, to grant to another party, the holder, a potential
right to acquire an interest in the property at a future time.8  This Article
focuses on aging preferential purchase rights in real estate transactions,
although similar issues come up in several other contexts.9
gion/in-the-hamptons-a-fight-over-land-is-also-one-over-water.html?_r=0 [https://
perma.cc/DD9K-9YAH].
4. See id.
5. See Smolian, 12 N.Y.S.3d at 830–31, 837–40.
6. Id. at 842.
7. Portions of this Article originally appeared in a paper the author presented
to the American College of Real Estate Lawyers. See Carl J. Circo, Purchase Options,
ROFRs, and ROFOs: Theory and Practice, in ACREL PAPERS—SPRING 2016 (AM. LAW.
INST. ed., 2016).
8. The real estate interest involved may be fee title, a leasehold, or something
else, but unless a particular context requires otherwise, this Article assumes the
interest is fee title.  Although real estate practitioners sometimes resort to other
preferential rights as alternatives to ROFRs and ROFOs, this Article does not con-
sider these other devices in detail because they are much less common and are less
frequently addressed by courts and legal commentators.  Other devices include a
right of last refusal and a right of first negotiation. See generally Jeremy’s Ale House
Also, Inc. v. Joselyn Luchnick Irrevocable Trust, 798 N.Y.S.2d 416 (App. Div. 2005)
(involving right of last refusal); John C. Murray, Options and Related Rights with Re-
spect to Real Estate: An Update, 47 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 63, 68–76 (2012); David
I. Walker, Rethinking Rights of First Refusal, 5 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 8–11 (1999).
9. See Walker, supra note 8, at 10–13 (noting that, in addition to being used in
real estate transactions, ROFRs often appear in agreements among corporate
shareholders and other business ventures, production contracts for commercial
products, employment agreements, and franchising arrangements); Robert K.
Wise et al., First-Refusal Rights Under Texas Law, 62 BAYLOR L. REV. 433, 440–42
2
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Agreements creating preferential rights to acquire interests in real es-
tate may take several different forms.  A lease may grant the right to the
tenant.  A buyer may negotiate for the right in a contract to purchase
other property.  A distinct contract between the grantor and the holder
may establish the right, or it may be incorporated into a deed by which the
grantor conveys related property to the holder.  A seller may secure an
opportunity to reacquire property by incorporating the right in the deed
conveying the property to a buyer.  No matter the form, litigation arises all
too often because the parties to these agreements fail to anticipate specific
circumstances that may emerge when the preferential right continues over
an extended term.
The Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes) (Restatement) re-
flects contemporary property law applicable to preferential purchase
rights.10  The Restatement’s fundamental principles, while generally
sound as far as they go, fail to provide an effective framework for analyzing
the common situation in which unforeseen developments render the par-
ties’ agreement incomplete. The problem requires something beyond
what the Restatement offers.
Drawing on recent cases, Part I of this Article briefly illustrates how
relationships between grantors and holders sometimes deteriorate into
disputes when preferential purchase rights remain in place over years, de-
cades, lifetimes, and beyond.  Using the Restatement as a point of refer-
ence, Part II explains why our legal system often proves inadequate to
resolve many of these disputes logically and fairly.  Most significantly, Part
II assesses the rationale and limits of the Restatement’s principles directly
relating to long-term preferential purchase rights, which primarily impli-
cate the Rule against Perpetuities (RAP) and the rule governing restraints
on alienation.11 Part II ultimately criticizes the current judicial approach
(2010) (explaining that first-refusal rights often appear in wide range of contexts,
including oil and gas instruments, power-generating contracts, distributorship and
dealership agreements, and many others).  Contracts in the entertainment indus-
try also sometimes include ROFRs or ROFOs. See generally Brit Grosskopf & Alvin
E. Roth, If You Are Offered the Right of First Refusal, Should You Accept? An Investigation
of Contract Design, 65 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 176 (2009).
10. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES §§ 1.1, 1.3 (AM. LAW INST.
2000) (referred to throughout this Article as “the Restatement” or “Restatement”).
The American Law Institute is currently working on the Restatement (Fourth) of
Property, but it does not appear that anything has yet been drafted on servitudes.
See Property, AM. L. INST., https://www.ali.org/projects/show/property/ [https://
perma.cc/4XKC-WE7Y] (last visited Apr. 14, 2017).  This Article draws on the cur-
rent Restatement primarily because it reflects a modern, overarching perspective
on options, ROFRs, and ROFOs.  Whether the drafters of the new Restatement
may or should address any of the relatively narrow issues discussed in this Article
remains a question for another time.
11. Both common law rules aim to promote transferability of property inter-
ests.  The RAP addresses the relatively narrow problems of remote vesting of prop-
erty interests generally associated with contingent future interests.  Professor John
Chipman Gray’s statement of the Rule remains the classic articulation: “No interest
is good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in
3
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that relies almost exclusively on such formal rules to regulate long-lasting
preferential purchase rights.  Part III examines how grantors and holders
can best structure their agreements to anticipate and manage the inherent
risks and asks what more courts can do to resolve disputes logically and
fairly.  Part III(A) argues that the superior approach under existing law is
for the parties themselves to negotiate comprehensive agreements that an-
ticipate and resolve every reasonably foreseeable contingency.12  Unfortu-
nately, only the most sophisticated parties take that approach, and even
they cannot address every issue that may arise in the distant future.  As a
result, for most grantors and holders, a preferential purchase right with an
extended duration is simply a bad idea under existing law.  In light of this
dilemma, Part III(B) proposes an alternative interpretive model for courts
to use when relationships between grantors and holders (or their succes-
sors in interest) break down in the face of unforeseen circumstances.  If
the express terms of the governing agreement prove inadequate because
the contracting parties failed to anticipate the future circumstances, courts
should use a more flexible approach that acknowledges the relevant con-
textual aspects of the dispute and that accords appropriate weight to the
passage of time.13
being at the creation of the interest.”  John Chipman Gray, THE RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES § 201, at 191 (4th ed. 1942).  The RAP primarily regulates dead-hand
controls stemming from attempts by property owners to determine who will enjoy
their property for generations to come. See, e.g., Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola
Props., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 799, 802–03 (N.Y. 1996).  The separate rule governing
restraints on alienation prohibits certain restrictions on an owner’s right to trans-
fer an interest in property and is more broadly concerned with preserving rela-
tively free transferability of property interests. See generally Luke Meier & Rory
Ryan, Aggregate Alienability, 60 VILL. L. REV. 1013, 1015–16 (2015).  It renders unen-
forceable those preferential purchase rights that courts consider to be unreasona-
ble restrictions on transfer. See, e.g., Bortolotti v. Hayden, 866 N.E.2d 882, 890
(Mass. 2007).
12. For purposes of this Article, a contract is incomplete whenever a contrac-
tual dispute stems from circumstances that the parties did not explicitly address in
a written agreement.  Courts, lawyers, and contract scholars do not necessarily
mean the same thing when they call a contract incomplete.  See Robert E. Scott &
George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design, 56 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 187, 190–91 (2005).  Professors Scott and Triantis refer to “the com-
plete, contingent contract—one that specifies obligations in each possible state of
the world.” See id. at 189.  This Article essentially references to that same notion of
a complete contract, although without a focus on the economic efficiency charac-
teristics that are important to economic theory. See id. at 190–91.
13. To some extent, Part III(B) of this Article proposes that courts might
learn from relational contract theory when addressing disputes involving preferen-
tial purchase rights, just as certain drafting techniques that experienced real estate
lawyers use, as described in Part III(A), reflect relational contract norms.  Rela-
tional contract theory emphasizes, among other things, context and flexibility for
purposes of managing exchange relationships, and it eschews rigid rules. See gener-
ally Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract and Default Rules, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.
43, 54–58 (1993).  The judicial approach recommended in Part III(B), however,
does not explicitly rely on relational contract theory.
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I. THE FUTURE IS UNCERTAIN
Parties contracting for preferential purchase rights are planning for
future circumstances that they imagine but cannot predict.  If the future
unfolds as they have anticipated, their relationship should not break
down.  The option holder either will purchase during the term of the op-
tion agreement under the contemplated terms or will allow the option to
expire.  During the term of a ROFR or ROFO, the grantor either will or
will not want to sell, and if the grantor wishes to sell, the holder either will
or will not purchase according to the terms of the triggering offer
(whether coming from a third party, in the case of a ROFR, or from the
grantor or the holder, in the case of a ROFO).  In fact, however, disputes
too often arise because the future does not line up well with the parties’
expectations.  The longer the preferential right continues, the greater the
risk that circumstances eventually may significantly alter how the right af-
fects either the grantor or the holder.
This Part highlights three recent cases that demonstrate how
long-lived preferential purchase rights may generate disputes that are
hard to resolve under the existing legal framework.  The first case stems
from a ROFR, the second from a ROFO, and the third from an option to
purchase.
The Smolian case out of Long Island, mentioned at the beginning of
this Article, serves as the first example.14  It illustrates the problem espe-
cially well if, as the New York Times’ version of the story has it, Richard
Smolian negotiated the ROFR, in conjunction with the sale of a few unde-
veloped acres to Alexander Peters, to make sure that the Smolian family
could prevent further development should Peters later wish to sell some
part of land not needed for Peters’s own residence.15  Note that use of the
ROFR in this way presumably would allow Smolian to charge the full mar-
ket price, taking into account the land’s development potential, because
Peters could recoup that value by negotiating an arms-length, third-party
sale whenever he wished.  Under these circumstances, the ROFR might
not be triggered, or at least the Smolians logically would not opt to exer-
cise it, when Peters proposed to sell the property to the Town of East
Hampton under a contract imposing a use restriction assuring that the
land would remain in its natural state.16  But, as things turned out accord-
ing to the newspaper’s account of the dispute, Richard’s son, Jonathan,
decided that he wished to build on the land himself, or perhaps hoped to
14. See Peters v. Smolian, 12 N.Y.S.3d 824, 829–31 (Sup. Ct. 2015), aff’d on
other grounds, 154 A.D.3d 980 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
15. See Chaban, supra note 3.
16. The contractual use restriction took the form of an acknowledgment by
seller and buyer that the property would “remain as open space, as authorized by”
certain resolutions of the town board. See Smolian, 12 N.Y.S.3d at 831.  The original
contract between Peters and the town, however, did not include the use restric-
tion; it was added about four months later by a rider to the contract. See id. at
830–31.
5
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profit from its ever-increasing development value.  As the court analyzed
the case, the original parties’ underlying motivation in negotiating the
ROFR was but a matter of irrelevant speculation because Jonathan’s rights
depended solely on a set of technical legal rules.17  For present purposes,
the question of interest is not whether the case was rightly or wrongly de-
cided, but how the circumstances in 2014, when Peters wished to sell the
property to the town, fit into the deal the contracting parties made when
Peters acquired the two parcels in 1992 and 1997.18
Changed circumstances played a more central role in SKI, Ltd. v.
Mountainside Properties, Inc.19  The predecessor to SKI sold thirty-three
acres to Mountainside for development purposes and granted a ROFO to
Mountainside on sixty-two additional acres that could not then be devel-
oped because of inadequate sewer treatment capacity.20  At the time, the
grantor owned the sewer treatment facilities, located on other land, that
would presumably be able to provide the necessary capacity at a later date.
The ROFO provided that if the grantor decided to sell the sixty-two acres,
it would first offer that property to Mountainside at its market value (as
determined by the grantor), along with sewer disposal rights sufficient for
a designated number of dwelling units.21  By virtue of various subsequent
transactions, title to the sixty-two acres eventually came to be held by SKI,
while an unrelated development group acquired the sewer treatment facil-
ities and other neighboring land.22  Mountainside became an active oppo-
nent of the neighboring group’s development plans.23  When SKI decided
to sell the sixty-two acres, it made an offer to Mountainside to sell the
property for $390,000, along with sewer disposal rights sufficient for eight
dwelling units.24  The offer, however, was contingent on Mountainside
agreeing not to oppose any plans for development of the neighboring
land.  SKI claimed that because it no longer owned the sewer treatment
facilities, the only way that it could offer sewer disposal rights along with
the sixty-two acres was to comply with the neighbor’s no-contest condition.
The primary issue presented to the Vermont Supreme Court was
whether SKI’s offer complied with the terms of the ROFO.  The court held
that it did not: “The record supports the trial court’s finding that the
ROFO did not anticipate that Mountainside would have to give up its
rights to oppose development within the Killington Ski Area in order to
17. See id. at 835–40.
18. A partnership and a limited liability company held interests in some of the
properties, but Peters apparently controlled those entities. See id. at 830.  The
court treated Peters effectively as the owner of the properties, and this Article does
the same.
19. 114 A.3d 1169 (Vt. 2015).
20. See id. at 1171.
21. See id.
22. See id. at 1171–72.
23. See id.
24. See id.
6
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exercise its rights.”25  As a result, the ROFO remained in force, and SKI
was not free to sell the property to a prospective purchaser who was willing
to accept the no-contest condition.
By approaching the issue this way, the court ignored the correspond-
ing question—whether the ROFO agreement anticipated that SKI could
effectively be prevented from liquidating its holdings in the area.  SKI
raised this point by arguing that the ROFO constituted an illegal restraint
on alienation because, as the circumstances evolved, Mountainside might
be able to prevent the sale of the property indefinitely given that SKI had
no control over the neighboring investor’s demand for the no-contest
agreement as a condition to providing the sewage disposal rights.26  Ap-
parently satisfied that commercial realities might ultimately resolve the di-
lemma, the court reasoned that “while the condition may have stalled the
transfer of the parcel, it does not definitively preclude alienation of the
sixty-two-acre parcel.”27
A recent Washington case provides a good example of unanticipated
developments radically affecting the motivations of parties to an option
agreement.  What makes the case especially interesting is that the relevant
developments apparently were completely beyond the control of either
the grantor or the holder.28  The holder, a private college that subleased
two floors of the building in question, missed a deadline for making a
$50,000 payment to extend the option to purchase contained in the sub-
lease.29  Although the court recognized that strict compliance is normally
required to exercise an option, “equitable relief from such strict construc-
tion may be warranted in limited circumstances where an inequitable for-
feiture would otherwise result.”30  While other aspects of the case (several
of which suggest questionable motives on the sublessor’s part) undoubt-
edly affected the outcome,31 it is fair to say that the court’s willingness to
approve the trial court’s decision to allow an equitable grace period for
exercising the option was influenced by evidence that the grantor was at-
tempting to avoid the option because an appraisal showed that the prop-
erty had appreciated as a result of a recent rezoning of the area such that
the property was likely worth well over $7,000,000 instead of the
$3,000,000 option price.32
25. See id. at 1175.
26. See id. at 1177–80.
27. See id. at 1180.
28. See Cornish Coll. of the Arts v. 1000 Va. Ltd. P’ship, 242 P.3d 1, 9 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2010).
29. See id. at 5–7.
30. See id. at 9 (citing Wharf Rest., Inc. v. Port of Seattle, 605 P.2d 334, 340–41
(Wash. Ct. App. 1979)).
31. See infra notes 229–32 and accompanying text.
32. See Cornish Coll. of the Arts, 242 P.3d at 10.  The sublessor leased the entire
property under a master lease with the fee owner, an affiliated entity; a single doc-
ument served as both the sublease and the option agreement. See id. at 5–6.
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While these three cases offer especially helpful illustrations, many
other preferential rights cases also show how unforeseen future develop-
ments produce perplexing contractual disputes, especially those stemming
from a grantor’s failure to anticipate how a long-term ROFR or ROFO
might become unduly restrictive.  For example, given enough time, a
grantor whose sole focus once was to promote a relationship that might
lead to an eventual sale of the property at a favorable price may become
more interested in making a gift of the land to a relative.33  In other in-
stances, years after the agreement establishing a ROFR, the grantor may
unexpectedly encounter the opportunity to swap the land for other prop-
erty that has unique value to the grantor.34  One of the most common
situations involves an unanticipated proposal by a third party who wishes
to buy a larger tract owned by the grantor that includes the property sub-
ject to ROFR.35
In all of these situations, the passage of time in one sense or another
places the ROFO or ROFR in a significantly different context than what
existed when the original agreement was struck.  As Part II shows, how-
ever, in preferential rights disputes current law ascribes but a minor role
to context and little, if any, significance to temporal considerations.
II. LONG-TERM PREFERENTIAL PURCHASE RIGHTS UNDER CURRENT LAW
As noted at the beginning of this Article, the three categories of pref-
erential purchase rights most commonly used in real estate transactions
are options to purchase, ROFRs, and ROFOs.36  As a preliminary matter,
this Part summarizes the distinct legal characteristics of each of these de-
vices.  It then reviews how current law, as articulated by the Restatement,
deals with long-lasting preferential purchase rights, and it explains why
existing legal principles are inadequate to resolve many of the disputes
that these arrangements tend to engender.
A. The Legal Characteristics of Options, ROFRs, and ROFOs
1. Purchase Options
As a matter of contract law, a purchase option is a one-sided contrac-
tual device by which the grantor makes a binding offer to sell the property
to the holder.37  For a more or less fixed time, an option imposes a legal
33. See, e.g., Rucker Props., L.L.C. v. Friday, 204 P.3d 671, 673 (Kan. Ct. App.
2009); Schroeder v. Duenke, 265 S.W.3d 843, 845–46 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008).
34. See, e.g., Castle Props., Inc. v. Wasilla Lake Church of the Nazarene, 347
P.3d 990, 992–93 (Alaska 2015).
35. See, e.g., DePetrillo v. Belo Holdings, Inc., 45 A.3d 485, 493 (R.I. 2012);
Advanced Recycling Sys., LLC v. Se. Props. Ltd. P’ship, 787 N.W.2d 778, 780 (S.D.
2010).
36. Other less common devices include a last right of refusal, a first right to
negotiate, and a commitment by the grantor to sell the property, if at all, via a
public auction. See Circo, supra note 7, at 12, 29, 31.
37. See, e.g., Steiner v. Thexton, 226 P.3d 359, 364 (Cal. 2010).
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obligation on the grantor to transfer the property to the holder.  It gives
the holder an enforceable right to purchase the property, but it does not
obligate the holder to purchase nor, in the usual case, does an option bind
the holder to any other obligations unless and until the holder elects to
convert the offer to sell into a purchase and sale agreement.  During the
term that the option is in effect, at least if the holder has given considera-
tion, the grantor’s offer is irrevocable.38  For that reason, option agree-
ments almost always clearly define the duration of the holder’s rights.
Most recurring legal issues surrounding options involve well-settled
legal principles.  As a matter of contract law, because an option obligates
the grantor to sell if the holder exercises the right, an option establishes
an irrevocable offer to sell during the specified term only if it is supported
by consideration.39  To transform an option into a purchase and sale con-
tract, the holder must accept the offer by properly exercising the option.40
This typically means taking precise steps established by the document cre-
ating the option.  The exercise must be timely, and it must conform to any
other specified requirements concerning how and to whom a notice of
exercise should be given.  Further, because the holder’s exercise of an op-
tion creates an enforceable purchase and sale contract, the option must
include the material terms of the sale.41  For these reasons, the option
agreement or other governing document typically provides for monetary
consideration for the grant and includes at least the key terms that will
come into effect as the sale contract once the holder exercises the option.
2. Rights of First Refusal
In contrast to an option, a ROFR is not an offer by the grantor to sell
the property.  A ROFR restricts the grantor’s future freedom to sell the
property during the term of the ROFR by giving the holder the opportu-
nity to acquire the property in preference to any third party should the
grantor wish to sell.42  A ROFR creates some contract rights and burdens
relating to the property, but the characteristics of those rights and bur-
dens will vary significantly based on the parties’ intent and the precise
language they use to create the ROFR.
The classic ROFR empowers the holder to accept what is in effect, if
not in form, an irrevocable offer from the grantor at a future time to sell
the property to the holder on terms satisfactory to the grantor, as defined
38. See, e.g., id. at 365.
39. See, e.g., id.
40. See, e.g., Foye v. Parker, 790 N.Y.S.2d 787, 788 (App. Div. 2005).
41. See, e.g., Creely v. Hosemann, 910 So.2d 512, 520 (Miss. 2005).
42. See, e.g., Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., 973 A.2d 1229, 1246 (Conn. 2009)
(explaining distinction between option and ROFR and holding that once grantor
notified holder of acceptable third-party offer ROFR ripened into option to
purchase); Anderson v. Parker, 351 S.W.3d 827, 831 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011) (discuss-
ing distinctions between option and ROFR).
9
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by the terms of a third-party offer that the grantor is willing to accept.43
The event that triggers the holder’s right is the third-party offer that the
grantor finds satisfactory.  The grantor’s notice of the third-party offer
functionally becomes the grantor’s offer to transfer the property to the
holder on those same terms.  Because the grantor’s offer at that point is
irrevocable for the period established for the holder’s exercise under the
terms of the ROFR agreement, the grantor’s notice converts the ROFR to
an option in the holder to purchase the property.
In this more or less standard version of a ROFR, the phrase “right of
first refusal” recognizes that the grantor may not sell to the third party
unless the holder refuses to enter into a contract to purchase the property
on the terms proposed by the third party.  Once the right is triggered, if
the holder exercises it, the parties enter into a purchase and sale agree-
ment on the specified terms, and if the grantor will not execute an agree-
ment on those terms, the holder is generally entitled to specific
performance.44  If the holder declines to exercise the right, the grantor is
free to sell the property to the third-party offeror (and perhaps to anyone
else) on those terms but not on terms that are less favorable (or perhaps
materially less favorable) to the grantor.  From one jurisdiction to another,
the cases characterize the interest that a ROFR creates in different ways,
sometimes as a real property interest, but more commonly merely as a
contract right.45
Until the point when a triggering event converts a ROFR into an op-
tion to purchase, the most common legal issues concerning ROFRs involve
matters of contract interpretation.  As a result, cases often turn more on
the particular terms the parties negotiated than on general common law
principles.  A ROFR agreement normally designates the duration of the
right, the manner in which the grantor must notify the holder of the op-
portunity, the length of time the holder has to exercise the right after
receiving the notice, and the process the holder must follow to exercise
the right.  More comprehensive ROFR agreements address many other
contingencies and nuances, including what specific events and circum-
stances will or will not trigger the right, whether the holder’s exercise may
deviate in certain respects from the terms of the third-party offer, whether
and under what circumstances the grantor may sell the property to some-
one other than the specified third party if the holder does not exercise the
right, whether the holder’s right will survive if the holder declines to exer-
cise the right but the deal with the third party does not close, and more.46
43. See Murray, supra note 8, at 70.
44. See, e.g., Jarvis v. Peltier, 400 S.W.3d 644, 654 (Tex. App. 2013).
45. See Wilhelmina F. Kightlinger, To Insure or Not to Insure, That Is the Question:
Title Insurance Considerations for Options, Rights of First Refusal, and Other Similar
Rights, in ACREL PAPERS—SPRING 2016 2 (AM. LAW. INST. ED. 2016).
46. See Murray, supra note 8, at 65–68, 134–37 (discussing importance of clear
and comprehensive drafting and providing sample ROFR agreements in appen-
dixes B and C); Joshua Stein, It Seemed Like a Good Idea at the Time: Rights of First
10
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3. Rights of First Offer
A ROFO, like a ROFR, restricts the grantor’s future freedom to sell
the property during the term of the ROFO by giving the holder a contrac-
tual preference to acquire the property if the grantor wishes to sell during
that time.47  Just like a ROFR, a ROFO is not an offer by the grantor to sell
the property.  Courts, real estate investors, commentators, and attorneys
do not always clearly distinguish ROFOs from ROFRs.  As used in this Arti-
cle, a ROFO differs from a ROFR primarily because a ROFO leaves it to
the grantor, or under an alternative structure to the holder, rather than to
a third party, to specify the terms of the offer that triggers the right.  If the
grantor wishes to consider selling the property during the term of a
ROFO, the grantor must notify the holder, who then has the opportunity
to accept the grantor’s terms or, in the alternative version, to make the
first offer. While the practice literature commonly refers both to the gran-
tor offer structure and to the holder offer variation of the ROFO, the lead-
ing contemporary ROFO cases typically involve ROFO provisions that
require the grantor, not the holder, to make the offer once the grantor
gives notice of the desire to sell.48
In either variation, if the grantor and the holder agree on the terms
offered, they enter into a purchase and sale agreement on that basis.  If
not, the ROFO agreement generally allows the grantor to market the
property but only on terms that are the same as the first offer or at least not
materially less favorable to the grantor.  As with ROFRs, in practice the terms of
ROFOs vary significantly from transaction to transaction.  With a few ex-
ceptions, ROFOs and ROFRs typically generate similar legal issues.  In rec-
ognition of this similarity, this Article sometimes groups ROFRs and
ROFOs together as “preemptive rights” to distinguish them as a subcat-
egory of preferential purchase rights that includes options to purchase as
well as ROFRs and ROFOs.  Where, however, significant differences re-
quire distinct analyses, this Article discusses ROFRs and ROFOs separately.
B. The Restatement’s Principles Governing Long-Term Preferential
Purchase Rights
On the whole, the Restatement reflects current law governing prefer-
ential purchase rights.  To be sure, cases in different jurisdictions deviate
from the Restatement and from each other on some of the most theoreti-
cal questions, such as whether or when to classify a preferential purchase
right as a property interest or merely as a contract right, and the extent to
Offer and First Refusal, 42 N.Y. REAL PROP. L.J., no. 4, Fall 2014, at 6, 14–15 (provid-
ing extensive list of drafting points).
47. See Murray, supra note 8, at 76.
48. An economic analysis might discern that these two variations on ROFOs
create significantly different incentives.  See generally Marcel Kahan et al., First-
Purchase Rights: Rights of First Refusal and Rights of First Offer, 14 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
331, 354–61 (2012) (providing detailed economic analysis of ROFOs in which
grantor must make first offer).
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which the RAP applies.  As a practical matter, however, the Restatement
and contemporary courts generally approach disputes that involve the du-
ration of preferential purchase rights with essentially the same juridical
perspective.  Moreover, the Restatement offers the most coherent and
comprehensive set of principles currently available for analyzing preferen-
tial purchase rights.  As the discussion that follows shows, however, the
Restatement falls short of providing a fully satisfactory framework for ana-
lyzing long-term preferential rights.
The Restatement classifies options to purchase, ROFRs, and ROFOs
as servitudes burdening the grantor’s title and, as a result, treats all of
these preferential purchase rights similarly for many purposes.  In some
important respects, however, the comments to the Restatement distin-
guish between options to purchase and ROFRs.  In the few instances in
which the comments explicitly mention ROFOs, they treat them as forms
of ROFRs rather than as a distinct brand of servitude.  The contemporary
cases also frequently treat ROFRs and ROFOs together, at least in the con-
text of durational disputes.  In keeping with this approach, unless other-
wise noted, the analysis that follows presumes that the Restatement’s
principles governing ROFRs also apply to ROFOs.
Litigation involving the duration of preferential purchase rights most
often presents issues under the RAP, the rule on restraints on alienation,
or both.  Accordingly, the Restatement’s principles on these rules provide
the logical place to begin this overview.
Section 3.3 of the Restatement bluntly provides that the RAP does not
apply to servitudes and therefore cannot be a basis for voiding preferential
purchase rights.49  Although the Restatement’s position on the RAP devi-
ates from the traditional majority view, it reflects what may be a growing
trend in the contemporary cases, at least with respect to ROFRs.50  In any
event, on policy grounds, the Restatement’s analysis is sound.  The RAP is
far too connected to historical concerns about dead-hand control over
family wealth to deserve a place among the principles governing
arms-length real estate transactions as routine as preferential purchase
49. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 3.3 cmt. a.
50. See Murray, supra note 8, at 94–101 (indicating that majority of jurisdic-
tions still apply RAP to preferential purchase rights).  The modern cases are incon-
sistent and, if a trend exits, it is still evolving. See, e.g., Old Port Cove Holdings, Inc.
v. Old Port Cove Condo. Ass’n One, Inc., 986 So.2d 1279, 1285 (Fla. 2008) (declin-
ing to apply common law RAP to ROFR that predated Florida Uniform Statutory
Rule Against Perpetuities); Pew v. Sayler, 123 A.3d 522, 532 (Me. 2015) (holding
that ROFR in deed violated RAP and was void, but same ROFR in separate contract
was valid as against parties to contract); Bortolotti v. Hayden, 866 N.E.2d 882, 891
(Mass. 2007) (declining to apply common law RAP to ROFR that predated Massa-
chusetts Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities); Hensley-O’Neal v. Metro.
Nat’l Bank, 297 S.W.3d 610, 615–16 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (applying RAP to ROFR);
Jarvis v. Peltier, 400 S.W.3d 644, 652 (Tex. App. 2013) (holding that ROFR does
not violate RAP).
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rights are in contemporary practice.51  While sound policy reasons justify
an artificial time limit to protect distant generations from a deceased an-
cestor’s vision for the future, such a rigid restriction makes little sense
when parties negotiate over preferential purchase rights.
As an alternative to the RAP, the Restatement provides that courts
should analyze challenges based on the time period during which prefer-
ential rights may be exercised under the rule governing direct restraints
on alienation.52  That rule permits certain restraints that are reasonable
under the circumstances.  Property interests, such as an option to
purchase, a ROFR, or a ROFO, should not be invalidated automatically
because of an extended duration.  As applied to preemptive rights, the
rule against unreasonable restraints on alienation establishes a sensible
control by imposing the burden on the party challenging a preemptive
right to articulate to a court in what respect a preferential purchase right
unreasonably conflicts with the law’s bias favoring free alienability of prop-
erty.53  Thus, in assessing the validity of long-term servitudes as a class, the
Restatement adopts a practical approach by opting for the more flexible
principles governing restraints on alienation rather than the RAP.  In ap-
plying those principles, the Restatement treats options and preemptive
rights differently.
If an option agreement, other than one appurtenant to a leasehold
estate, does not specify a duration, the Restatement conveniently provides
that the option lasts for a reasonable period, thereby sidestepping reasona-
bleness challenges to options that might otherwise be viewed as lasting
indefinitely.54  The following excerpt from a comment to section 3.4 sum-
51. A contemporary court may apply the RAP to preferential rights primarily
in deference to long-standing precedent even while acknowledging the strong pol-
icy arguments against doing so. See Symphony Space, Inc. v. Pergola Props., Inc.,
669 N.E.2d 799, 804–05 (N.Y. 1996) (noting that New York law exempts certain
preferential purchase rights from RAP, including tenant’s option to purchase
leased property during leasehold term, but holding that controlling precedents
required invalidation of particular option to purchase involved in case); see also CS-
Lakeview at Gwinnett, Inc. v. Simon Prop. Grp., Inc., 642 S.E.2d 393, 397 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2007), aff’d, 659 S.E.2d 359 (Ga. 2008) (applying Delaware law to invalidate
ROFR under RAP while acknowledging policy conflict with Georgia law, under
which RAP does not apply to ROFR).
52. RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 3.4 cmt. f.
53. The Restatement states as follows:
A preemptive provision does not control to any extent the transfer of
property other than by sale.  Unless its existence reduces the likelihood
that an opportunity to sell the property subject to the provision will arise
should the owner desire to sell, the provision simply provides a possible
buyer who is constantly available.  As long as another interested buyer is
not likely to be deterred from making an appropriate offer, the preemp-
tive provision does not interfere with the alienability of the property
involved.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 4.4 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1983).
54. RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 4.3 cmt. e.  Special considerations apply to
options created in leases. See id. cmt. c.
13
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marizes the most important considerations of the Restatement’s rule relat-
ing to restraints on alienation as applied to options:
e. Options.  The reasonableness of an option in gross to purchase
land is determined by the duration of the option and the price.
If the price is set at fair market value when the option is exer-
cised, the practical effect of the restraint is much less than if the
price is fixed, and a longer duration is justifiable.  If the price is
fixed, the effect of the option is to discourage improvement of
the land, and the option is unreasonable unless its duration is
specified.  Even if the duration is specified, an option for a
lengthy period may be unreasonable unless the length is justified
by the purpose, or unless it is clear that the parties expressly bar-
gained over the specified duration.  If the duration is not speci-
fied, an option terminates after a reasonable time under rules
stated in §§ 4.3 and 7.2.55
Ordinary options to purchase will almost always survive judicial scru-
tiny under these principles because rational property owners instinctively
avoid making long-term, fixed-price offers to sell.56  Under the usual com-
mercial arrangement, an option agreement sets a specified purchase price
for a relatively short duration.  As an alternative, the option agreement
may provide for a longer term if the purchase price is to be determined
based on a current market appraisal at the time of exercise.
Other comments explain how the Restatement’s rule concerning re-
straints on alienation applies to ROFRs.57  The general principle is that
validity of a ROFR under the rule “depends on the legitimacy of the pur-
pose, the price at which the holder may purchase the land, and the proce-
55. See id., § 3.4 cmt. e.
56. A real estate option is “in gross” if it is transferrable but not appurtenant
to some other real estate interest owned by the holder. See id. § 4.5(1)(b).  The
comments to section 3.4 do not offer any guidance of general application concern-
ing the reasonableness of an option that is appurtenant to an interest in real es-
tate.  The comments do specifically address two situations that would often involve
appurtenant options.  First, the reasonableness of an option in favor of owners in a
common ownership regime, such as under a property owners’ declaration “is de-
termined by the circumstances, including the price and the terms for exercise.”
See id. § 3.4 cmt. e.  Second, the same comment provides that an option “to repur-
chase in the event the property is not developed within a particular period of time
may also be reasonable, depending on the price, duration, and other circum-
stances.” See id.  Apparently, the Restatement intends to leave most questions
about the reasonableness of appurtenant options to the broad rule of section 3.4,
which calls for reasonableness to be determined “by weighing the utility of the
restraint against the injurious consequences of enforcing the restraint.” See id.
§ 3.4.  Note that the duration of an option appurtenant to a leasehold would ordi-
narily be coterminous with the leasehold and would be subject to the law of land-
lord and tenant rather than any contrary principles of the law of servitudes. See,
e.g., id. § 4.3.
57. See id. § 3.4 cmt. b.
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dures for exercising the right.”58  Beyond this rather vague guidance, the
comments to the Restatement advance the proposition that a typical
ROFR imposes such a modest restraint on alienation (presumably, be-
cause the grantor remains free to market the property at any time) that
the duration of the right should rarely affect validity.  Indeed, ROFRs “of
indefinite duration may be valid, but once they trigger an option to
purchase, the duration of the option must be limited to avoid invalidation
as an unreasonable restraint on alienation.”59  Another significant distinc-
tion that the Restatement makes between options and ROFRs involves the
treatment of an agreement that does not explicitly address the duration of
the preferential purchase right.  As already noted, the Restatement pro-
vides that an option terminates after a reasonable time if the agreement
does not specify a term.60  If a ROFR agreement does not specify a dura-
tion, however, the Restatement provides that the ROFR will continue
indefinitely.61
Note that the Restatement’s relaxed principles concern the duration
of the ROFR and not the length of time available to the holder to decide
whether or not to exercise the right after the triggering event occurs.
That is, an indefinite time during which the ROFR survives is generally
acceptable and is even implied when the agreement does not specify how
long the right itself continues, but a long or indefinite duration for exer-
cising the option that results when the right is triggered is a different mat-
ter.  This attitude toward ROFRs seems practically to create a presumption
against almost any claim that a ROFR itself is an illegal restraint on aliena-
tion.  Yet in some other respects, the Restatement’s perspective on unrea-
sonable restraints could justify deeper scrutiny of the context of a ROFR.
The following excerpt from the most relevant comment demonstrates
these nuances:
If the right to purchase is on the same terms and conditions
as the owner may receive from a third party, if the procedures for
exercising the right are clear, and if the period within which it
must be exercised is relatively short, the right of first refusal is
valid unless the purpose is not legitimate.  Since the practical ef-
fect of the restraint on alienability is minimal, duration of the
first-refusal right should not affect validity.
If the price at which the right of first refusal may be exer-
cised is fixed, either absolutely, or by reference to a formula, the
impact on alienability is greater than if the seller will get the
same price whether or not the right is exercised.  Stronger justifi-
cation is required.  The duration of such a restraint may be im-
portant in determining its reasonableness.
58. See id. § 3.4 cmt. f.
59. See id. § 4.3 cmt. c.
60. See id. § 4.3 cmt. a.
61. See id. § 4.3 cmt. e.
15
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The provisions governing exercise of the right of first refusal
are important in determining its impact on alienability.  Lack of
clarity may cause substantial harm by making it difficult to obtain
financing and exposing potential buyers to threats of litigation.
Lengthy periods for exercise of rights of first refusal will also sub-
stantially affect alienability of the property.  Potential buyers will
be deterred by the possibility that they may not know for a
lengthy period of time whether they will obtain the property or
be obligated to pay the price.  The risks of change in their needs
and in financial markets will be greater than most buyers will be
willing to accept.  Strong justification would be required to con-
clude that any right of first refusal that imposed vague proce-
dures or long waiting periods was not an unreasonable restraint
on alienation.62
These principles have considerable practical significance.  Unlike op-
tions to purchase, the durations of ROFRs and ROFOs frequently corre-
spond to long-term planning affecting those having a connection to the
same or related property or some relationship to each other.63  For exam-
ple, they may stem from sales of other property within a development,
co-tenancies, ongoing business ventures, dealings between neighboring
property owners, or succession planning for either business interests or
family wealth management.  At the inception, the parties will often view a
long duration not only as mutually beneficial, but practically risk-free be-
cause a preemptive right does not obligate either party to do anything
unless and until the grantor triggers the right.  Yet, neither the grantor
nor the holder can predict how the relevant circumstances and relation-
ships may change over time.  As a result, a long incubation period can
contribute to disputes.
On the basis that preemptive rights ordinarily do not significantly re-
strain alienation, the Restatement concludes that even a preemptive right
having an indefinite duration is normally valid absent other factors that
may cause the right to be viewed as an unreasonable restraint.64  The Re-
62. Id. § 3.4 cmt. f.  For a case involving a ROFR that used a purchase price
formula, see Huntington Nat’l Bank v. Cornelius, 914 N.Y.S.2d 327 (App. Div.
2010), and for one involving a preferential right at a fixed purchase price, see
Nat’l City Bank v. Welch, 936 N.E.2d 539, 648 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010), that stated
deed establishing right at issue provided that holder could force sale of the prop-
erty at specified price after death of surviving grantee under the deed.
63. Options to purchase as well as ROFRs and ROFOs, of course, frequently
arise out of long-term lease transactions.  For those situations, however, the Re-
statement defers to landlord-tenant law, which is itself a contextual concession. See
infra notes 82–89 and accompanying text.
64. As noted in the paragraph that immediately follows in the text, the Re-
statement’s underlying assumption could be challenged because, in a practical
sense, ROFRs and ROFOs significantly impede marketability.  The impact, how-
ever, is of a different kind than the restraints of concern to the common law be-
cause preemptive rights adversely affect marketability but do not literally bar
alienation.  Moreover, exposing standard ROFRs and ROFOs to attack under the
16
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statement may well be correct in discerning no policy reason to invalidate
long-lasting preemptive rights.  It considers a long duration to be objec-
tionable only if, when combined with other factors, the right burdens
alienability to such an extent that it should be wholly unenforceable on
policy grounds.  This all-or-nothing approach is an understandable charac-
teristic of a principle designed to prohibit unreasonable restraints on
alienation.
So far, so good for the Restatement.
But should the inquiry into long-term preemptive rights end here?
The fact that a long-term preemptive right may survive a challenge under
the rule against illegal restraints on alienation does not necessarily mean
that duration should be wholly irrelevant when unanticipated circum-
stances lead to disputes over an aging ROFR or ROFO.  The question
should not invariably be limited to validity or invalidity at the time the
right is created.  The frequency and nature of litigation involving stale pre-
emptive rights suggests a need for some degree of judicial regulation that
goes beyond the traditional rule against illegal restraints on alienation.
Even though ROFRs and ROFOs will rarely run afoul of that ancient rule,
they do significantly impair marketability by indirectly discouraging
third-party interest and otherwise complicating proposed transfers.65  The
contracting parties often make these problems worse by drafting incom-
plete agreements that fail to imagine what the distant future may bring.
When preemptive rights extend over years, decades, and beyond, perhaps
some principle in addition to the rule against illegal restraints should em-
power courts to use a more flexible, contextual approach if the underlying
agreement proves to be incomplete in light of circumstances that have
changed significantly over time.
Chapter 4 of the Restatement, which provides rules for interpreting
the terms of servitudes, introduces a principle that could often help to
resolve disputes that arise when preferential purchase rights extend over
long terms.  Section 4.1(1) establishes this general rule: “A servitude
should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the parties ascer-
tained from the language used in the instrument, or the circumstances
surrounding creation of the servitude, and to carry out the purpose for
which it was created.”66  Section 4.2 then sets the stage for a series of de-
fault rules articulated in sections 4.3 through 4.13 that courts should use
to fill in gaps when the parties’ agreement creating a servitude fails to
address one of the selected topics that those sections cover.  Section 4.2
goes on to add this broad principle for situations in which none of the
default rules of interpretation under sections 4.3 through 4.13 apply: “If
additional terms are necessary to determine the rights and obligations of
rule against illegal restraints would evade rather than address the contract inter-
pretation question.
65. See infra notes 173, 196, & 209 and accompanying text.
66. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 4.1(1).
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the parties or their successors, terms that are reasonable under the cir-
cumstances are supplied by the court.”67
Taken literally, section 4.2 invites courts to supplement the parties’
explicit agreement as needed when unanticipated circumstances arise in
the future, thereby taking a step toward a more contextual approach to
interpretation.  In fact, however, neither the notes and comments to the
Restatement nor the cases that adopt the Restatement expressly invoke
this provision for any such purpose.  At least insofar as the recent cases go,
chapter 4 seems to have had no significant impact on the interpretation of
preemptive rights agreements when the distant future brings circum-
stances that the parties to those agreements never contemplated.  Part III
analyzes how this state of current law impacts contracting practices when
parties enter into long-term preferential rights, and then it proposes a
more contextual model courts could use to interpret disputes in the face
of incomplete contracts.
III. DRAFTING PRACTICES AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION PRINCIPLES
This concluding Part initially reviews how experienced real estate law-
yers draft preferential rights agreements to anticipate a wide range of po-
tential disputes.  Taking their instruction from the many reported cases in
which courts have resolved contested issues without sufficient guidance
from the contractual language, knowledgeable lawyers for grantors and
holders routinely avoid or at least carefully manage the most common
risks that an uncertain future presents.68  A continuous flow of lawsuits
shows, however, that too many grantors and holders suffer from gaps left
by incomplete contracts.  The second subsection of this Part reconsiders
the limits of the dominant interpretive principles, and it proposes a more
contextual model for courts to use when the future outmaneuvers the con-
tracting parties’ foresight.
A. Contracting Practices for Long-Term Preferential Purchase Rights
Contemporary practice literature demonstrates that experienced real
estate lawyers, mindful of the incomplete contract dilemma, work dili-
gently to manage the considerable risks their clients face when entering
into preferential rights agreements.69  These lawyers caution their clients
67. See id. § 4.2.
68. Several papers presented at the spring 2016 meeting of the American Col-
lege of Real Estate Lawyers discuss many practical issues and drafting solutions. See
Kathryn E. Allen, Beware the Horse You Rode in on—“Preferential” Is Her Name and
Mischief Is Her Game, in ACREL PAPERS—SPRING 2016 (AM. LAW. INST. ed., 2016);
Circo, supra, note 7; Kightlinger, supra note 45; Beat U. Steiner, Hold Your Horses
Before You Close That Deal: Rights of First Offer, Rights of First Refusal and Options, in
ACREL PAPERS—SPRING 2016 232 (AM. LAW. INST. ed., 2016).
69. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 8, at 91–93; Kevin L. Shepherd, Rights of First
Refusal: Poison Pills and Bad Faith, 21 PROB. & PROP. 52 (2007); Stein, supra note 46,
at 6.
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to weigh the risks and benefits of preferential purchase rights, especially
ROFRs and ROFOs.70  They know that, for grantors in particular, pru-
dence often favors rejecting a proposal for a preferential right or coun-
tering it with some alternative.71  In many transactional settings, however,
prospective buyers aggressively press for preferential purchase rights, and
grantors regularly conclude that the requested device best serves their im-
mediate transactional interests as well.72  In these situations, unless the
preferential right will be of short duration, one constant challenge is how
to deal with an uncertain future.73
When expert real estate attorneys represent sophisticated grantors
and holders, the preferred tactic calls for the most comprehensive agree-
ment feasible under the circumstances.74  To a considerable extent,
knowledgeable lawyers can anticipate and cover a wide range of circum-
stances that might develop during an extended relationship between the
grantor and the holder.  While even the most experienced and cautious
lawyer cannot completely account for all future events, this strategy often
serves the well-represented client adequately.  As the discussion that fol-
lows shows, however, the risks and practical solutions differ significantly
between options to purchase and preemptive rights.
1. Options to Purchase
Options to purchase admit of some fairly standard negotiating and
drafting solutions, largely dictated by market forces and the relatively clear
legal principles that govern the enforceability of options.75  In the first
place, market considerations ordinarily lead the negotiating parties to
70. See Stein, supra note 46, at 14 (concluding that ROFRs and ROFOs “create
a world of trouble and surprise for all parties involved”).
71. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 8, at 37–43 (discussing reasons why would-be
grantor should consider, as alternatives to ROFR, commitment to negotiate with
would-be holder in good faith for fixed period or commitment to offer property, if
at all, via public auction).
72. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 46, at 7.
73. See, e.g., id. at 14–15 (providing extensive drafting suggestions, many of
which anticipate problems that might arise during life of preferential right).
74. See Joshua Stein, Model Right of First Offer, 42 N.Y. REAL PROP. L.J., no. 4,
Fall 2014, at 20 (providing recommended provisions for ROFO in long-term
ground lease); Video: Beat U. Steiner, Easier Said Than Done: Rights of First Of-
fer, Rights of First Refusal and Options, Presentation at the 34th Annual Colorado
Real Estate Symposium (2016) (Colorado Bar Association) (providing checklist of
issues to address in preferential rights agreements).
75. See generally Ronald Benton Brown, An Examination of Real Estate Purchase
Options, 12 NOVA L. REV. 147, 206 (1987) (concluding that promulgation and use
of standardized forms can solve most significant problem presented by option con-
tracts, which is failure of parties to address certain key aspects of option agreement
and details of purchase contract that will result if holder exercises option); Greg-
ory G. Gosfield, A Primer on Real Estate Options, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 129,
137–56 (2000) (summarizing essential elements of an option contract).
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agree on a relatively short option period.76  Because an option is a form of
offer to sell the property that is irrevocable during the option term, the
parties also normally agree either on a purchase price that is fixed for a
short term or an objective method for determining fair market value at the
time the option is exercised.77  Few property owners, even among the least
sophisticated, will agree to lock in a sale price for an extended period.78
Moreover, the rule against illegal restraints on alienation threatens to in-
validate an option granted for an unusually long term, especially one that
sets a fixed price.79  Additionally, the RAP, although in decline as a limita-
tion on options, remains a factor in many jurisdictions.80
Market forces, together with basic tenets of contract law, typically
mandate that an option holder who wants to keep the property off the
market for more than a short time will pay a meaningful option price.
Unless and until the holder pays for the right, an offer to sell may be
revocable for lack of consideration.81  When a holder wishes to keep the
option in effect over a long term, sophisticated grantors and their legal
counsel often require a higher option fee, perhaps payable on a periodic
basis, to prevent expiration of the right.82  Alternatively, an option agree-
ment providing for the purchase price to be determined based on a
formula or a future appraisal may overcome a grantor’s resistance to a
long duration.83  Addressing the price in one of these ways could also
overcome a challenge under the rule against illegal restraints on
alienation.84
Even when an option agreement has a long duration, the legal princi-
ples governing enforceability practically assure that parties represented by
competent counsel will negotiate a comprehensive agreement that not
only reduces the risk of litigation but that also guides courts in resolving
disputes when they occur.  Experienced attorneys know to set out detailed
76. See COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS § 7:77 (Westlaw, 3d ed. 2016)
(noting that option periods traditionally last only thirty to ninety days).
77. See Gosfield, supra note 75, at 141–44.
78. See COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, supra note 76, § 7:77 (noting
that although holder may seek relatively long period, grantor “will want to limit the
term of the option because the property will not be on the market during the time
the option is in effect”).
79. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, §3.4 cmt e.; Brown, supra note 75, at 195.
80. See Brown, supra note 75, at 192–95.
81. See, e.g., Steiner v. Thexton, 226 P.3d 359, 365 (Cal. 2010); LaRoche v.
Nehama, 979 So.2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 87(1)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
82. See COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, supra note 76, § 7:77 (dis-
cussing “rolling option” structure in which holder “has the ability to extend the
option by making additional option payments”).
83. See Gosfield, supra note 74, at 142–44.
84. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 3.4 cmt. e (providing that long-term
option to purchase is less likely to be invalidated as unreasonable restraint on
alienation if purchase price is at fair market value at time of exercise rather than at
fixed price).
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procedures for exercising the option and explicit provisions determining
the consequences of a failure to follow those procedures.85  Additionally,
because the holder’s exercise of an option creates an enforceable
purchase and sale contract, the practicing bar recognizes that an option
agreement must include the material terms of the deal.86  Particularly
from the holder’s perspective, these considerations militate in favor of a
comprehensive written agreement that unambiguously sets out the
timeframe and procedures for exercising the option and that includes the
terms of the resulting contract.87
Leases often give tenants relatively long-term options to purchase the
leased property, but options in leases constitute a special category.88  The
applicable legal principles are somewhat more protective of the option.
The Restatement recognizes this by deferring to landlord-tenant law to the
extent of any “special rules and considerations” that apply to preferential
purchase rights created by covenants in leases.89  In most jurisdictions a
tenant’s option to purchase tied to the leasehold estate requires no sepa-
rate consideration and the RAP does not apply.90  For purposes of the rule
on restraints on alienation, courts that adopt the Restatement should not
consider a tenant’s option to be a restraint on the landlord’s fee title at
all.91  In jurisdictions in which a tenant’s option is viewed as a restraint,
courts typically hold that it is reasonable for the option to continue
throughout the lease term, especially if the price will be determined by an
appraisal, is based on a formula or process intended to result in a fair
market price, or if the tenant has made significant capital improve-
ments.92  Even an option to purchase at a fixed price at any time during a
long-term may be reasonable.93
Contemporary practices for incorporating the material terms of the
prospective purchase and sale agreement into the option vary across juris-
dictions.  Attaching a complete copy of the proposed purchase and sale
85. See Gosfield, supra note 75, at 151–52.
86. See, e.g., id. at 155–56. See generally Creely v. Hosemann, 910 So.2d 512,
520 (Miss. 2005).
87. See COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS, supra note 76, § 7:77 (advis-
ing that best practice is either “to include a copy of the proposed contract as an
exhibit to the option, or to include the contract terms in the option”).
88. See generally Brown, supra note 75, at 168–72; Stein, supra note 46 (discuss-
ing ROFRs and ROFOs primarily in context of ground leases).
89. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 1.1(2)(a).
90. See Murray, supra note 8, at 99–100 (discussing inapplicability of RAP
when option is integral to a leasehold interest).
91. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT § 15.2 cmt. a
(AM. LAW INST. 1977).
92. See Brown, supra note 75, at 196.
93. See Mr. Sign Studios, Inc. v. Miguel, 877 So.2d 47, 49 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004); Venture Stores, Inc. v. Pac. Beach Co. Inc., 980 S.W.2d 176, 185 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1998).
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agreement is a prudent method.94  In that way, the parties avoid disagree-
ments over the terms of the deal after exercise, and the holder, in particu-
lar, precludes any argument that the agreement omits any material terms.
But in locations where standard contract forms are used for certain prop-
erty types, an acceptable shortcut may be to specify that the parties will
execute the standard form.95  A riskier approach is for the option agree-
ment to state only those terms the parties consider material, with an ex-
press or implied agreement that open terms must conform to standard
practices.96  As long as the parties have included the essential terms, such
as the parties’ identities, pricing, an adequate property description, and
the method of exercising the option, courts will often fill gaps in option
contracts based on customary practices and standard forms for real estate
sales contracts in the jurisdiction.97  To this extent, the incomplete con-
tract problem is less severe for options to purchase than it is for other
preferential rights agreements, especially ROFRs.98
The net result of all these factors is that a well-drafted option agree-
ment is typically complete enough to manage at least the most common
causes of disputes between the parties.  If properly structured, the option
price should compensate the grantor on a basis that takes into account the
option’s duration.  The agreement will also normally include, implicitly if
not explicitly, all of the terms that will come into effect as the contract of
purchase and sale once the holder exercises the option.  This is particu-
larly important because, as Part I shows, the fact that parties to ROFRs and
ROFOs, as distinguished from options, do not know in advance all the
terms that the triggering offer will include, accounts for some of the most
common disputes over preferential purchase rights.
Even when parties enter into inadequately drafted option agree-
ments, recent option cases suggest that problems associated with long du-
ration are not prominent.99  Litigation most often involves the application
94. See, e.g., LaRoche v. Nehama, 979 So.2d 1021, 1022 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2008).
95. See, e.g., Elderkin v. Carroll, 941 A.2d 1127, 1130 (Md. 2008) (option
agreement called for “standard contract”).
96. See, e.g., Creely v. Hosemann, 910 So.2d 512, 520 (Miss. 2005).
97. See 1 MILLER & STAR, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTate § 2:11 (Westlaw, 4th ed.
2016) (acknowledging willingness of courts to fill in gaps in this way but cautioning
that better practice is for parties to include all terms of prospective sale in option
agreement).
98. When a ROFO agreement fails to specify certain terms of the ultimate sale
contract a court might presume that the grantor and the holder must have in-
tended that terms other than the purchase price would conform to standard prac-
tices.  But with a ROFR, and sometimes even with a ROFO, customary practices
may be largely irrelevant if the triggering offer includes unique terms that the
grantor and the holder did not anticipate. See infra notes 122–34 and accompany-
ing text.
99. See generally Brown, supra note 75, at 206–11 (arguing that three most com-
mon legal problems associated with options to purchase involve: using option
when some other device, such as loan or participation venture, is more appropri-
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of fundamental legal principles, such as lack of consideration, the impact
of the Statute of Frauds, or failure to include material terms.100  Other
cases present routine questions of contract interpretation.  This latter cate-
gory includes factual disputes over compliance with contract terms gov-
erning exercise of the option.101  Another common question of contract
interpretation is whether the parties intended the option to be transfer-
rable.102  In almost all of these cases, the dispute could have been simpli-
fied or avoided entirely had the parties documented their agreements in
accordance with established best practices.103
2. Preemptive Rights
ROFRs and ROFOs present contexts markedly different from those
typical of options to purchase.  Property owners and prospective buyers
use these preemptive rights in a wide range of situations and then must
live with them later, often in the distant future, when the circumstances
may be much different from what they anticipated.  Unlike option con-
tracts, preemptive rights agreements cannot specify the detailed terms of
the potential sale contract between the grantor and the holder because
that deal must match the unknown terms of a future triggering offer.  Dis-
putes stemming from incomplete preemptive rights contracts are
common.104
Experienced real estate lawyers negotiating and drafting these agree-
ments know that they must become familiar with the nuances of the gov-
erning jurisdiction’s law concerning preemptive rights and, even more
importantly, must strive to craft contract terms that anticipate and resolve
many theoretical and practical issues that the future could bring.105  Risks
associated with incomplete contracts, however, remain inherent in the
ate; violating RAP or rule against illegal restraints on alienation; and failing to
address all material terms of ultimate sale contract).
100. See, e.g., Steiner v. Thexton, 226 P.3d 359, 365 (Cal. 2010) (discussing
consideration); Elderkin, 941 A.2d at 1130 (enumerating material terms); Pardee v.
Jolly, 182 P.3d 967, 972–73 (Wash. 2008) (explaining Statute of Frauds).
101. The traditional rule requires that the holder strictly comply with the
terms of the agreement relating to the exercise of the option. See, e.g., Casey v.
Nat’l Info. Servs., Inc., 906 So.2d 710, 719 (La. Ct. App. 2005); Elderkin, 941 A.2d at
360–61; Parker v. Booker, 822 N.Y.S.2d 156, 160 (App. Div. 2006).  Some recent
cases, however, adopt a substantial compliance standard. See, e.g., Brunswick Hills
Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 864 A.2d 387, 399 (N.J.
2005); Cornish Coll. of the Arts v. 1000 Va. Ltd. P’ship, 242 P.3d 1, 9 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2010).
102. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 4.6 (declaring that servitude benefits
(and therefore option rights) are generally transferrable if it is not personal).
103. See generally Brown, supra note 75, at 211 (concluding that “the rules and
theories governing purchase options are not that difficult” provided that con-
tracting “parties actually take the effort to agree fully to the terms” and otherwise
understand governing legal rules).
104. See Stein, supra note 46, at 6–8; Murray, supra note 8, at 64–68.
105. See Stein, supra note 46, at 14–15.
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preemptive rights structure because unanticipated problems often materi-
alize only when a future offer is made that triggers the preemptive right or
a circumstance develops that tempts the property owner to structure a
transaction in a way that arguably falls outside of the preemptive right.106
As explained in Part II of this Article, the two theoretical issues most
often tied to the duration of a preemptive right concern whether or how
to apply the RAP and the rule against illegal restraints on alienation.107
While either of these legal principles may present significant issues for the
uninitiated, they should rarely stump experienced counsel.
In jurisdictions where the RAP remains a concern, the holder’s lawyer
simply must draft around whichever version of the rule applies.108  In a
few jurisdictions, this is still essentially the common law rule.109  In others,
it is a version of the Uniform Statutory Rule Against Perpetuities.110  No
matter which variation is involved, real estate lawyers know how to struc-
ture the term of the agreement to protect validity.  Parties to transactions
in these jurisdictions may sometimes be disappointed that they cannot cre-
ate indefinite or perpetual preemptive rights, but the practical impact is
generally insignificant when experienced counsel is involved.  In rare
cases, the RAP may blindside even sophisticated parties and their coun-
sel.111  For the most part, however, the RAP, when it applies, is nothing
but an ambush awaiting an inattentive victim.  On policy grounds, many
jurisdictions now agree with the Restatement that the RAP should not ap-
ply at all to preemptive rights.112
106. See Stein, supra note 74, at 20 (opining that no ROFR or ROFO “will ever
actually work as the parties expect” and “will instead simply create disputes, issues,
and uncertainty”).
107. Other theoretical issues discussed in the practice literature include com-
pliance with the Statute of Frauds, the application of Article 9 of the UCC, the
impact of the jurisdiction’s recording act, the application of the relation-back doc-
trine, and the effect of bankruptcy. See Murray, supra note 8, at 107–15.  While
these considerations may require lawyers documenting the deal to be aware of the
issues, they do not generally involve durational concerns.  In any event, if the law-
yers recognize these issues to the extent relevant to the particular transaction, they
can usually structure the deal to avoid the associated legal problems.
108. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 8, at 101.
109. See, e.g., Pew v. Sayler, 123 A.3d 522, 528 (Me. 2015); Hensley-O’Neal v.
Metro. Nat’l Bank, 297 S.W.3d 610, 615 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
110. See CS-Lakeview at Gwinnett, Inc. v. Simon Prop. Grp., 642 S.E.2d 393,
397 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007), aff’d sub nom., 659 S.E.2d 359 (Ga. 2008) (discussing con-
trasting applications of Delaware’s version of RAP and Georgia’s version of uni-
form act in connection with ROFR).
111. See id. at 397 (explaining that joint venturer in commercial project was
foiled by contractual choice-of-law provision that resulted in application of Dela-
ware RAP to invalidate ROFR that would have been valid under Georgia law, where
property was located).
112. See, e.g., Old Port Cove Holdings, Inc. v. Old Port Cove Condo. Ass’n
One, Inc., 986 So.2d 1279, 1285–88 (Fla. 2008); Bortolotti v. Hayden, 866 N.E.2d
882, 887–90 (Mass. 2007); Jarvis v. Peltier, 400 S.W.3d 644, 652 (Tex. App. 2013).
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Concerns with the rule governing restraints on alienation can be
slightly more difficult for lawyers to address due to the vagueness of a rule
that generally turns on reasonableness when applied to preemptive rights.
Even so, the rule typically represents a mild obstacle because the contem-
porary cases in most jurisdictions measure reasonableness only by refer-
ence to the time during which the holder may exercise the right after it
has been triggered, not by the length of time that the right is in effect.113
This again comports with the Restatement’s view.114  As noted previously,
the Restatement even approves of ROFRs with indefinite terms as long as
the holder has only a reasonable time in which to exercise the right once
it has been converted to an option by the triggering event.115  Under this
approach, few preemptive rights can be successfully challenged because
the standard arrangement calls for preemptive rights to be exercisable
only during a relatively short time after the grantor notifies the holder of
the triggering event.116  Contemporary courts consistently uphold pre-
emptive rights as reasonable restraints where the agreement gives the
holder a relatively short time to exercise the right following the triggering
event.117
The more significant problems associated with long-term preemptive
rights exist at the practical rather than the theoretical end of the spec-
trum.118  On these matters, knowledgeable real estate practitioners often
agree that preemptive rights agreements should anticipate and address po-
tential issues in great detail.119  The practice literature recommends ad-
dressing several common drafting issues that can arise with almost any
preemptive right, and some of those become distinctly more important
with longer-term preemptive rights.120  Most of these concerns apply both
to ROFRs and ROFOs, although, as noted below, not always to the same
extent or in the same way.121
Perhaps the most commonly litigated issue concerns what it means
for the holder of a ROFR to match a third-party offer in order to exercise
the right.122  This problem arises in several different recurring variations.
113. See, e.g., Bortolotti, 866 N.E.2d at 890–91; MS Real Estate Holdings, LLC v.
Donald P. Fox Family Trust, 864 N.W.2d 83, 91–92 (Wis. 2015).
114. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 4.3 cmt. c.
115. See id.
116. See Stein, supra note 46, at 8 (indicating that thirty-day period for exercis-
ing preemptive right is common).
117. See Bortolotti, 866 N.E.2d at 890–91; Peters v. Smolian, 12 N.Y.S.3d 824,
838 (Sup. Ct. 2015), aff’d on other grounds, 154 A.D.3d 980 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017);
SKI, Ltd. v. Mountainside Props., Inc., 114 A.3d 1169, 1177–80 (Vt. 2015).
118. See Circo, supra note 7, at 5–7.
119. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 8, at 63, 77–91, 116–32; Steiner, supra note
74.
120. See, e.g., Murray, supra note 8, at 77–91 (discussing “carve-out” provisions
used to anticipate future transactions that may or may not serve as triggering
events under preemptive rights agreements).
121. See Circo, supra note 7, at 25–26; Stein, supra note 74, at 24.
122. See Allen, supra note 67, at 14–17; Shepherd, supra note 66.
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For example, experienced lawyers know to plan for the possibility that
a potentially triggering offer may specify either more or less property than
what the preemptive right covers.123  The issue comes up often in the con-
text of a proposed package deal, a bulk sale, or a proposed subdivision.124
Parties may provide for the package deal possibility by agreeing that an
offer relating to more or less property than that to which the right applies
will not trigger the right but also will not extinguish it.125  With that ap-
proach, the right will continue to apply to a subsequent offer for the spe-
cific property subject to the preemptive right.  Under such an agreement,
if the grantor sells to a third party a tract that includes the encumbered
land plus other property, the new owner may not later accept an offer to
purchase the parcel subject to the ROFR without giving the holder the
right to match that offer.  Only the parties’ imaginations limit other possi-
ble approaches, which include agreeing that the holder may prevent a
package sale or will have the right to match the offer to purchase the en-
tire property, or that the grantor’s acceptance of a package deal will extin-
guish the holder’s right.  Similar drafting solutions can address the
possibility that a triggering offer may cover only a portion of the property
subject to the preemptive right.
A comprehensive preemptive rights agreement will also usually ad-
dress another fairly common version of the matching problem—what to
do about unique terms in the third-party offer that the holder either can-
not precisely match or that the holder may logically view as infeasible or
economically irrational to match.126  This issue often emerges when a trig-
gering offer involves the transfer of stock or some other equity interest as
consideration for the proposed sale.127  Less common, but still significant
123. See Allen, supra note 68, at 17.
124. See DePetrillo v. Belo Holdings, Inc., 45 A.3d 485, 493 (R.I. 2012) (not-
ing that triggering offer included more land than what ROFR covered); Advanced
Recycling Sys., LLC v. Se. Props. Ltd. P’ship, 787 N.W.2d 778, 785 (S.D. 2010)
(explaining that triggering offer covered entire development that included leased
property subject to ROFR); Riley v. Campeau Homes (Texas) Inc., 808 S.W.2d 184,
189 (Tex. App. 1991) (holding that triggering offer was to purchase all units
owned by seller in condominium project, which included unit subject to ROFR).
See generally Murray, supra note 8, at 80–86 (discussing several cases involving “port-
folio or bulk” sales transactions).
125. See Allen, supra note 68, at 17.
126. See infra notes 205–18 and accompanying text for a discussion of the SKI
case, in which the triggering offer included a covenant by the proposed buyer not
to oppose development plans that the holder was already contesting. See also Shep-
herd, supra note 69, at 54–55 (discussing “poison pill” provisions of triggering of-
fers that are repugnant to holder’s specific interest in property).
127. See, e.g., Roeland v. Trucano, 214 P.3d 343, 351 (Alaska 2009) (explain-
ing that transfer to LLC that resulted in same parties retaining control of property
did not trigger ROFR).
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in light of the reported cases, are special financing terms128 or a restrictive
covenant limiting the buyer’s use of the property.129
The potential that a future offer may include unique terms makes it
impossible for the parties to address every possibility.  In many cases, the
holder could be allowed to match the third-party offer by agreeing to pay a
price premium that assures the grantor an economically comparable
deal.130  Some courts have adopted this as an appropriate remedy for a
complaining holder.131  Such solutions, whether built into the negotiated
agreement or introduced by a court, will be less than ideal because the
parties may have radically different views on what the appropriate price
adjustment should be in the particular situation.132  Moreover, some spe-
cial terms, such as a third-party offer to maintain the property in its natu-
ral and undeveloped state, cannot necessarily be measured by monetary
value to the grantor.133  One way to manage some unique terms is to clas-
sify certain contract provisions, such as a specific closing date, closing loca-
tion, or escrow arrangement, as immaterial and therefore not subject to
the matching requirement or requiring only substantial compliance.134
Some cases have relieved the holder from the obligation to match immate-
rial terms, but others insist on precise matching.135
128. See Christian v. Edelin, 843 N.E.2d 1112, 1115 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006)
(finding that holder’s offer that included financing condition was not substantially
same as cash terms of triggering offer).
129. See Del. River Pres. Co., Inc. v. Miskin, 923 A.2d 1177, 1182 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2007) (finding that holder failed to exercise ROFR effectively by not agreeing
to restriction included in triggering offer to prohibit development of property).
130. See Circo, supra note 7, at 7.
131. See Castle Props., Inc. v. Wasilla Lake Church of the Nazarene, 347 P.3d
990, 989–99 (Alaska 2015) (explaining that when triggering offer involved land
swap that grantor had special interest in acquiring, ROFR holder had right to
make commercially equivalent offer, but grantor could reject holder’s alternative
offer on commercially reasonable basis); Roeland, 214 P.3d at 349–50 (holding that
if holder cannot “exactly duplicate” aspects of triggering offer, holder “may pro-
pose comparable terms”).
132. See Castle Props., 347 P.3d at 997 (approving grantor’s determination that
holder’s cash offer was not commercially comparable to property swap proposed
by triggering offer); St. George’s Dragons, L.P. v. Newport Real Estate Grp., L.P.,
971 A.2d 1087, 1101–02 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (rejecting grantor’s argu-
ment that holder had to offer not simply same purchase price as triggering offer,
but same net yield to grantor after taking into account brokerage commissions
payable).
133. See infra notes 179–99 and accompanying text discussing the Smolian
case.
134. See Steiner, supra note 68, at 237 I-6 (noting that holder may want agree-
ment to specify that  matching offer is one on “substantially (materially) the same
terms” or “commercially similar terms” rather than exactly terms set out in notice
triggering right).
135. See Shepherd, supra note 69, at 53 (noting cases holding that matching
requirement in ROFR agreement only requires holder to match material terms of
triggering offer). Compare Fienberg v. Hassan, 928 N.E.2d 356, 359 (Mass. App. Ct.
2010) (finding holder who failed to match the third-party offer’s closing date did
not validly exercise the ROFR), with Jones v. Stahr, 746 N.W.2d 394, 403 (Neb. Ct.
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Matching issues affect ROFOs less commonly than ROFRs because
with a ROFO the triggering offer comes from either the grantor or the
holder rather than a third party and contemplates a sale contract directly
between the holder and the grantor.  Even so, a matching problem can
arise under a ROFO.  For example, a package deal issue may arise if the
grantor wishes to sell more or less property than what the ROFO covers.136
Another matching issue may result if the holder and the grantor do not
come to terms over the first offer and the holder subsequently accepts a
third-party offer with additional or different terms that are difficult to
compare to the first offer.137  A grantor’s first offer may lead to a dispute
over whether the holder must match every detail of that offer no matter
how unexpected or insignificant the detail may be.138
The practice literature also recommends that preemptive rights
agreements should anticipate that the grantor may someday wish to trans-
fer the property by gift, may wish to incorporate the property in some way
into an estate plan or a business succession plan, or may be willing to
accept less than fair market value should a particular purchaser wish to
acquire the property.139  The popular shorthand drafting solution pro-
vides that only a bona fide offer will trigger the preemptive right.140  Pre-
dictably, this approach has led to enough litigation to convince many
lawyers to negotiate extensive provisions that exclude from the preemptive
right several potential transactions that the parties can agree to
exclude.141
In addition to using carve-out provisions to exclude one or more of
the possible transactions just mentioned, thoroughly structured preemp-
tive rights agreements may explicitly address certain other transactions af-
fecting title that experience shows can lead to disputes between grantors
and holders.  All kinds of financings involving the property fall into this
App. 2008) (finding holder’s addition of clause reserving right to assign was not
fatal deviation from terms of third-party triggering offer).
136. See Kutkowski v. Princeville Prince Golf Course, LLC, 300 P.3d 1009,
1009–10 (Haw. 2013) (holding that grantor could not sell 1040-acre tract that in-
cluded half-acre parcel subject to ROFO without giving holder right to purchase
smaller parcel).
137. See infra notes 203–20 and accompanying text where a somewhat similar
situation is suggested by the SKI case that explains a proposed sale to the ROFO
holder failed to close a few years before a triggering offer was made that included a
unique term unacceptable to the holder.
138. A ROFO agreement could be drafted to contemplate this issue. See
Stein, supra note 74, at 22 (suggesting model ROFO agreement in which any no-
tice triggering ROFO must specify “all material economic terms” that grantor
proposes).
139. See Murray, supra note 8, at 77–79.
140. See, e.g., Bergman v. Commerce Trust Co., N.A., 129 P.3d 624, 626 (Kan.
Ct. App. 2006); Schroeder v. Duenke, 265 S.W.3d 843, 848 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008).
141. See Murray, supra note 8, at 77–91; Steiner, supra note 68, at 236.
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category, as do various debt workouts, arrangements between co-owners or
partners, and business restructurings.142
The reality of an uncertain future complicates the process of negotiat-
ing and drafting carve-out provisions when the parties agree on a preemp-
tive right that has an especially long duration.  A grantor’s motivations (in
good faith or otherwise) for favoring a particular future transaction involv-
ing the property over a standard and presumably market-driven sale to the
holder may evolve in totally surprising ways.  Unanticipated developments
may relate to the grantor’s family situation or other personal relation-
ships,143 the relationship of the burdened property to other property that
the grantor owns,144 or a perceived impact that a future sale, either to the
holder or to a different buyer, may have on the neighborhood or environ-
ment.145  The longer the duration, the less likely it is that the parties’
agreement will adequately express their mutual intentions relating to sur-
prise developments.
Countless disputes over the years involving such issues have per-
suaded some of the most experienced real estate lawyers to craft much
lengthier and more complex preemptive rights contracts.146  Yet, more
than one seasoned practitioner has expressed frustration or even despair
that the truly comprehensive agreement may be unattainable.147  Even if
nearly complete contracts are possible, the many grantors and holders
who do not know to ask for, cannot afford, or do not wish to pay for such
agreements are largely left out in the cold.  For these potential grantors
and holders, long-term preemptive rights are simply bad ideas due to the
risk of future disputes and litigation.
More than anything else, the practice literature teaches that preemp-
tive rights agreements take place in an environment that invites disputes
attributable to incomplete contracts when preemptive rights last for many
years.  The final subsection of this Article explores whether courts should
142. See generally Murray, supra note 8, at 78–79, 87–91 (discussing business
entity restructurings, foreclosure sales, deeds in lieu of foreclosure, and transfers
by eminent domain).  Based on the terms of the preemptive rights agreements
involved, recent cases have concluded that mortgage foreclosure sales did not trig-
ger preemptive rights. See Huntington Nat’l Bank v. Cornelius, 914 N.Y.S.2d 327,
249–50 (App. Div. 2010); Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Michael, 993 N.E.2d 786, 794
(Oh. Ct. App. 2013).
143. See Rucker Props., L.L.C. v. Friday, 204 P.3d 671, 673 (Kan. Ct. App.
2009) (holding that gift to family member did not trigger ROFR); Bergman, 129
P.3d at 630 (holding that transfer pursuant to will contest settlement agreement
did not trigger ROFR).
144. See Peters v. Smolian, 12 N.Y.S.3d 824, 829–30 (Sup. Ct. 2015), aff’d on
other grounds, 154 A.D.3d 980 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) (noting owner of property
encumbered by ROFR, who resided on adjoining land, wished to sell property to
government entity that would agree to preserve property in its natural state).
145. See id.
146. See generally Murray, supra note 8, at 77–91.
147. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 74, at 20; see also supra notes 69–72 and accom-
panying text.
29
Circo: Interpreting Stale Preferential Rights to Acquire Real Estate: Be
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2017
632 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62: p. 603
use a more flexible and contextual approach to contract interpretation
when dealing with circumstances that the contracting parties did not ex-
pressly anticipate.
B. An Alternative Judicial Model for Filling Gaps in Long-Term Preferential
Purchase Rights
The common law offers no easy solutions when contracting parties
dispute how to interpret their rights and obligations in the face of devel-
opments that they did not explicitly contemplate in their written agree-
ment.  In broad terms, an ongoing scholarly debate pits formalistic
approaches to contract interpretation against contextual ones.148  The
neoclassical understanding of contract is decidedly more contextual than
the classical perspective of the 19th and early 20th centuries, yet it has not
by any means abandoned formalism.149  Indeed, contemporary contract
scholarship provides renewed support for formalism.150  Similarly, a more
contextual approach to interpreting preemptive rights agreements has its
148. To reduce the competing scholarly perspectives on contractual interpre-
tation and gap-filling to a debate between formalists and conceptualists greatly sim-
plifies a vast, fascinating, and still-evolving body of theoretical analysis. See e.g.,
Steven J. Burton, Default Principles, Legitimacy, and the Authority of a Contract, 3 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 115, 133–44 (1993) (discussing alternative theories of default
rule analysis); David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract
Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1826–27 (1990) (referring to formalist, who
“treats interpretation as problem of decoding,” and the contextualist, whose meth-
odology “has a generative or context-specific aspect that resists reduction to code
formulations”); Ronald J. Gilson et al., Text and Context: Contract Interpretation as
Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 23, 23 (2014) (labeling two contrasting camps
as textualists and contextualists); Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and Sub-
stance in Contract Interpretation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 496, 497–98 (2004) (contrasting
formal approach “emphasizing certain potentially relevant interpretive materials,
and discounting or excluding others,” with substantive approach that promotes “a
more all-things-considered understanding”); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Con-
tract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926, 926 (2010) (referring to two contempo-
rary camps as formalists and antiformalists); see also Steven J. Burton, A Lesson on
Some Limits of Economic Analysis: Schwartz and Scott on Contract Interpretation, 88 IND.
L.J. 339, 340 (2013) (critiquing Schwartz and Scott’s theory of interpretation).  For
present purposes, however, the simplification will do.  Indeed, in an inquiry con-
cerned solely with a narrow topic of real estate transactions, it would truly be a
fool’s errand to engage in the broader debate.  The primary concern here is with
interpretive disputes attributable to preemptive rights contracts that must be en-
forced in light of developments that the parties did not expressly contemplate.  No
matter the merits of the alternative theories, in such relatively simple arguments
over contract interpretation, judicial opinions continue, for the most part, to di-
vide over whether or to what extent a devotion to text and formal rules of interpre-
tation preclude resort to context. See Gilson et al., supra at 35–36; Swartz & Scott,
supra at 928.
149. See Gilson et al., supra note 148, at 34–37.
150. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the
Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L REV. 1765, 1775 (1995);
Swartz & Scott, supra note 148, at 939.
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judicial proponents, but most courts have not strayed far from formalism,
at least not for long and not for most purposes.151
In keeping with this mixed approach to contract interpretation, re-
cent preferential rights cases mostly adhere to formalism, yet contextual
elements influence some of the most thoughtful decisions.  As the analysis
near the end of this subpart shows, a particularly significant concession in
some of the cases has been a willingness to assign controlling weight to the
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.152  Drawing on energy from
the formalist-contextualist divide, this concluding subpart proposes a
model courts can use whenever called on to interpret a preferential
purchase right, especially if the dispute develops many years after the orig-
inal parties entered into an agreement creating a preemptive right and
involves circumstances they apparently did not anticipate.
The Restatement’s principles for interpreting preferential purchase
rights agreements include both formal and contextual components.  In
considering the significance and potential impact of these principles, it is
important to keep in mind that the Restatement deals with the broad cate-
gory of servitudes, of which preferential purchase rights are a minor
subset.
Section 4.1 sets the stage with a nod to both theories of contract inter-
pretation, referring to surrounding circumstances as well as to the exact
language the parties use:
A servitude should be interpreted to give effect to the intention
of the parties ascertained from the language used in the instru-
ment, or the circumstances surrounding creation of the servi-
tude, and to carry out the purpose for which it was created.153
151. Courts interpreting preferential rights agreements often begin by pro-
claiming that they must apply the contractual language that the parties themselves
agreed to and must not supply other terms, as if that cliche´ could often be suffi-
cient to resolve interpretive disputes about which reasonable minds are manifestly
in conflict. See, e.g., Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., 973 A.2d 1229, 1247–48 (Conn.
2009); Randolph v. Reisig, 727 N.W.2d 388, 389 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006); SKI, Ltd. v.
Mountainside Props., Inc., 114 A.3d 1169, 1175–76 (Vt. 2015).  In easy cases, the
assertion is largely insignificant, but when a court invokes this principle to avoid
confronting a true contractual gap made apparent only by unforeseen develop-
ments, it is, at best, a disingenuous distraction.  For example, in SKI, the parties’
contractual terms did not consider how their rights and obligations would be af-
fected if, at a time in the distant future, the grantor could no longer provide sewer
treatment capacity to serve the property covered by the ROFO. See SKI, 114 A.3d at
1171.  When that situation materialized, like it or not, the circumstances required
the court to fill in the gap by interpreting the agreement in favor of one party or
the other.  The court’s interpretation was certainly defensible, but it was a gap-
filling one all the same. See infra notes 203–20 and accompanying text.  By con-
trast, in Cornish College, the court’s analysis of what the parties’ agreement required
for the tenant to extend its option to purchase was distinctly contextual. See Cor-
nish Coll. of the Arts v. 1000 Va. Ltd. P’ship, 242 P.3d 1, 18 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010);
infra notes 221–38 and accompanying text.
152. See infra note 187 and accompanying text.
153. RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, §4.1(1).
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As noted in Part II(B) of this Article, section 4.2, which serves prima-
rily to introduce the supplemental rules of interpretation established in
sections 4.3 through 4.13, includes this distinctively contextual statement:
“If additional terms are necessary to determine the rights and obligations
of the parties or their successors, terms that are reasonable under the cir-
cumstances are supplied by the court.”154
The implicitly expansive promises of sections 4.1 and 4.2 notwith-
standing, none of the Restatement’s eleven supplemental rules of inter-
pretation offers courts much help in resolving disputes stemming from
changes in circumstances or unanticipated developments over the course
of a long-term preferential purchase right.155  Two of the sections, how-
ever, deal with matters of duration.
Section 4.3 provides default rules for determining the duration of ser-
vitudes when the parties’ agreement is silent on the point.  Specific rules
apply to four distinct categories of servitudes, but only one of those applies
to any kind of preferential purchase right.  “An option to purchase prop-
erty, other than an option appurtenant to a leasehold estate, lasts for a
reasonable time.  The duration of an option appurtenant to a leasehold
estate is determined by the law of landlord and tenant.”156  The general
rule of section 4.3 that applies in the case of all other preferential
purchase rights, including ROFRs and ROFOs, provides: “The duration of
other servitudes is indeterminate.”157  This principle comports with the
perspective that ROFRs ordinarily do not operate as significant restraints
on alienation.158  As previously discussed, while the Restatement’s en-
dorsement of a preemptive right of indefinite duration reflects a sound
perspective on the policies behind the common law rule on illegal re-
straints on alienation, it ignores the many problems associated with
long-term preemptive rights.159
Section 4.4 addresses the duration of a party’s rights or obligations in
connection with a servitude.  These principles help implement the essen-
tial distinctions between servitudes that are in gross, appurtenant, or per-
sonal.  Section 4.4 may sometimes be relevant to preemptive rights
154. See id. § 4.2.
155. Some of the default rules of interpretation are more often important
with respect to prototypical servitudes, such as easements, than to preferential
rights. See id. § 4.8 (emphasizing location, relocation, and dimensions of servi-
tudes); id. § 4.9 (explaining servient owners right to use servient estate); id. §§ 4.10
& 4.11 (explaining use rights); id. § 4.12 (listing rights of multiple holders); id.
§ 4.13 (enumerating duties of repair and maintenance).  Others can be as relevant
to preferential purchase rights as to most other servitudes but do not concern the
kinds of contractual gaps that figure prominently in the recent cases. See id. § 4.5
(explaining how to determine whether benefit or burden is appurtenant, in gross,
or personal); § id. 4.6 (discussing transferability of benefits); id. § 4.7 (discussing
delegability and transfer of burdens).
156. Id. § 4.3(2).
157. Id. § 4.3(5).
158. See id. § 3.4 cmt. f.
159. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
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disputes that arise long after the original parties negotiated the terms of
the agreement, but it does not offer any help in interpreting an agreement
in the face of changed circumstances or unanticipated developments.160
Chapter 7 of the Restatement deals with modifications and termina-
tions of servitudes.  It includes sections concerning abandonment and es-
toppel.161  Either of these rules may occasionally be relevant to
preferential purchase rights.162  The topic having the most potential rele-
vance, however, is changed circumstances, which sections 7.10 and 7.11
address.  Unfortunately, neither of those sections deals with that concept
in connection with preferential purchase rights.  Section 7.11 only con-
cerns the narrow topic of conservation easements.  Section 7.10 states
principles of broader scope, at least nominally applicable to any servi-
tudes.  One of these rules allows a court to modify or terminate a servitude
if a change in circumstances “makes it impossible as a practical matter to
accomplish the purpose for which the servitude was created.”163  Situa-
tions may arise in which this principle would be relevant to the interpreta-
tion of a preferential right, but it holds limited promise for resolving the
kinds of disputes grantors and holders commonly litigate.164  The other
potentially relevant provision of section 7.10 allows for judicial modifica-
tion of a servitude if, “because of changed conditions the servient estate is
no longer suitable for uses permitted by the servitude.”165  The critical
phrase “uses permitted by the servitude” shows that the drafters did not
have preferential purchase rights in mind.166
Given that the Restatement classifies preferential purchase rights as a
category of servitudes, it is understandable that the drafters did not ad-
dress specific principles applicable to narrow questions of interpretation
160. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Jordan, 17 N.Y.S.3d 545, 546–47 (App. Div. 2015)
(holding that ROFR contained in deed was extinguished upon grantor’s death
because deed did not purport to bind grantor’s heirs and assigns).
161. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 7.4 (dealing with modification and
abandonment); id. § 7.6 (detailing modification or extinguishment by estoppel).
162. See, e.g., Waste Connections of Kan., Inc. v. Ritchie Corp., 298 P.3d 250,
267 (Kan. 2013) (concluding that holder was not estopped from pursuing its argu-
ment about price at which it could purchase under ROFR).
163. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 7.10(1).
164. The circumstances involved in SKI, Ltd. v. Mountainside Properties, Inc. ar-
guably presented such a circumstance, but the opinion does not mention the Re-
statement’s rules of interpretation.  114 A.3d 1169 (Vt. 2015). See infra notes
205–20 and accompanying text.
165. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 7.10(2).
166. Even if the premise of section 7.10(2) could apply because the property
subject to a preferential purchase right somehow becomes unsuited for purchase,
as might be the case when changing climate conditions result in the property be-
ing permanently submerged, it is hard to imagine what kind of modification a
court could approve that would “permit other uses under conditions designed to
preserve the benefits of the original servitude.” See id.
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relating to these rights under changed conditions.167  If sections 4.3 and
7.10 have much significance to the issue at hand, it is by way of analogy.
Should courts develop special principles of interpretation to help resolve
disputes attributable to circumstances that the parties to preferential
rights agreements did not anticipate and, if so, what kind of rules make
sense?168
The modest proposal offered here stems from the proposition that
context is often relevant to the interpretation of preferential purchase
rights and can be especially significant when disputes emerge concerning
preemptive rights long after the parties struck their bargain.  On that ba-
sis, courts should be open to a more flexible approach to resolving a dis-
pute that arises under a preemptive rights agreement, particularly one
that has a long duration.  As far as it goes, the Restatement provides saluta-
tory principles governing preferential rights, but it does not establish spe-
cific principles that will often help courts deal with gaps in preemptive
rights agreements.
The first relevant principle under the Restatement—that servitudes as
a category should be free of the RAP—has much to commend it.169  The
justifications for this conclusion have already been summarized.170  In def-
erence to precedent and the legislative prerogative, a few courts will con-
tinue to apply the RAP to at least some preferential rights.171  In those
jurisdictions, preferential purchase rights to which the courts have tradi-
tionally applied the RAP will remain subject to invalidation on that formal
basis, but that is a matter of marginal significance.
167. Whether classifying preferential purchase rights as a category of servi-
tudes is helpful as an analytic matter is a question of no immediate interest in this
Article.
168. An approach not addressed in this Article would encourage courts to
develop default rules to fill in gaps in preemptive rights agreements.  Arguably,
some courts have done so to address certain recurring questions of interpretation,
such as in the package deal cases or to deal with triggering offers that include
nonmonetary terms. See supra notes 119–34 and accompanying text.  Default rules
could be far more efficient than the highly contextual model proposed here.  The
contract interpretation issues of the greatest interest for purposes of this Article,
however, do not fit into recurring patterns to which default rules could easily ap-
ply, with the possible exception of the package deal problem.
169. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 3.3.
170. See supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., Pew v. Sayler, 123 A.3d 522, 528 (Me. 2015); Hensley-O’Neal v.
Metro. Nat’l Bank, 297 S.W.3d 610, 615 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009); see also Symphony
Space, Inc. v. Pergola Props., Inc., 669 N.E.2d 799, 804–05 (N.Y. 1996) (explaining
that, in interpreting New York’s RAP, precedents distinguish between options to
purchase, to which rule applies, and certain preemptive rights, to which it does
not).  The Symphony Space court acknowledged “compelling policy reasons” for not
applying the RAP to commercial options to purchase but held that legislative ac-
tion “similar to that undertaken by numerous other State lawmakers” would be
required to reform New York’s rule, which is codified. See Symphony Space, 669
N.E.2d at 805.
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The Restatement’s second principle, equally valid on policy grounds,
is that the rule against illegal restraints on alienation applies with full force
to options to purchase.172  As a result, a long-lasting option is subject to
challenge, particularly if, as is often the case, the option agreement pro-
vides for a fixed purchase price.173  The Restatement clarifies an impor-
tant point not often addressed in the cases by specifying that the
reasonableness of a preemptive purchase right’s duration, in contrast to
that of an option, turns not on the time during which the right continues
but on the time allowed for exercising the right once it has been trig-
gered.174  This too reflects a sound policy decision because the all or noth-
ing function of the rule against illegal restraints on alienation, just like the
function of the RAP, is to distinguish valid from invalid rights or interests.
Experience shows that long-term ROFRs and ROFOs often serve the eco-
nomic and other interests of the parties involved.  No policy requires the
law to preclude these arrangements on a categorical basis.
Beyond these basic principles concerning how two highly formal rules
should apply to servitudes, the Restatement offers little help for resolving
disputes over how to enforce a preferential rights agreement when it fails
to address circumstances central to the controversy.  A court inclined to-
ward a contextual approach can find support in the Restatement’s general
principles that (1) judicial interpretation should “give effect to the inten-
tion of the parties ascertained from . . . the circumstances surrounding
creation of the servitude”175 and (2) a court should supply “terms that are
reasonable under the circumstances” where “additional terms are neces-
sary to determine the rights and obligations of the parties or their
successors.”176
How might a court use this more contextual approach to resolve dis-
putes of the kind that are especially likely to arise concerning preemptive
rights?  And what, if anything, should the duration of the right have to do
with a contextual approach?  First, courts can and should acknowledge
that it is often inefficient or impractical, and sometimes it is impossible,
for parties to preemptive rights agreements to anticipate circumstances
that may lead to disputes in the future.  Second, courts should recognize
that long durations increase the probability of disputes over the proper
interpretation of a preemptive rights agreement.  As previously noted, the
experience with preemptive rights that last for long periods does not jus-
tify a rule of invalidation.  But any long-term preemptive right tends to
operate as a drag on the marketability of the property that can foster an
172. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 3.4.
173. See id. § 3.4, cmt. e.
174. See supra notes 57–62 and accompanying text.
175. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 4.1(1).
176. See id. at § 4.2.
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inordinate number of disputes about the proper interpretation of an “obli-
gationally incomplete” agreement.177
It is one thing to conclude that preemptive rights should be free from
property law’s all-or-nothing restrictions, but it is entirely another thing to
use fixed rules for interpreting preferential rights agreements to shield
long-term preemptive rights from careful judicial scrutiny.  Indeed, in
light of the arguably marginal social utility of long durations in some con-
texts, at least a modest degree of heightened scrutiny may be warranted
when a holder argues that a preemptive right should apply under circum-
stances that the contracting parties never anticipated during distant
negotiations.
Under this model, duration alone would never be determinative; it
would simply be one of the factors that the court should consider in assess-
ing the conflicting interpretations that the grantor and the holder pro-
pose.  When added to other contextual factors that courts already use in
these cases, the weight given to duration will sometimes turn the balance
one way or the other.
How might this alternative judicial model play out?  For that question,
a reassessment of the three cases highlighted in Part I is in order.  As will
be seen, these cases already take context into account but only to a limited
extent and without considering the duration of the right or the length of
time that has passed since its creation.
For the first example, consider the trial court’s ruling on cross-mo-
tions for summary judgment in the Smolian case.178  There, the court held
that an offer by Alexander Peters to sell to the Town of East Hampton
(where the property was located) triggered a twenty-year-old ROFR but
did not necessarily require the holder to match the preservation restric-
tion in the contract between Peters and the town.  Peters’s title to the two
tracts derived from deeds that included identical ROFRs.179  For conve-
nience, this discussion refers to the owners of the property simply as Pe-
ters, as did the court, because he was both the individual owner, who lived
on a neighboring tract, and the managing member of the co-owning lim-
ited liability company.180
The ROFRs ran in favor of a prior owner and three other members of
his family.  Because only the three family members were asserting rights
177. Professors Scott and Triantis have used the phrase “obligationally incom-
plete” to distinguish what lawyers typically mean when they say that a contract is
incomplete from what economists mean. See Scott & Triantis, supra note 12, at
190–91.  This Article deals mostly with the conceptually simpler notion that lawyers
have in mind.  Empirical studies and economic analysis, however, may help explain
how preemptive rights restrain alienability in ways that matter a great deal to real
estate lawyers and their clients. See Grosskopf & Roth, supra note 9, at 26–28;
Kahan et al., supra note 48, at 346; Walker, supra note 8, at 10–13.
178. See Peters v. Smolian, 12 N.Y.S.3d 824, 842 (Sup. Ct. 2015), aff’d on other
grounds, 154 A.D.3d 980 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
179. See id. at 830–31.
180. See id. at 829–30.
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under the ROFR, in his first count, Peters challenged the ROFR’s validity
primarily under the “stranger to the deed” rule.181  That rule, as articu-
lated by the court, invalidates a reservation or exception included in a
deed that runs in favor of someone who is not a party to the deed.182  The
court held that the ROFRs were not subject to that rule and that they also
did not violate New York’s version of the RAP or the rule against illegal
restraints on alienation.183  On all these issues, the opinion is well-rea-
soned, and the rulings on the second two points line up well with the
Restatement.184  The court’s dismissive treatment of an important ques-
tion of contract interpretation, however, merits close examination.
Peters’s second count presented the interpretation issue simply as
whether, if the three family members had a valid ROFR, they could exer-
cise it only by agreeing to purchase the property subject to the same use
restriction included in the pending contract with the town.185  In denying
Peters’s requested declaration that the holders would be bound to the
preservation condition, the trial court initially relied on procedural
grounds.  The court reasoned that Peters did not present a justiciable con-
troversy because he had not conditioned the contract with the town on
obtaining a waiver of the ROFRs, and he had never given the holders writ-
ten notice of their right to purchase the property.186  Had the court’s anal-
ysis ended there, the case would not present an opportunity to discuss a
contextual model for interpreting a long-term preemptive rights agree-
ment.  But for some reason, the court went on at length to analyze the
merits of Peters’s argument.
For this purpose, the court focused first on whether the no-develop-
ment provision of the proposed sale contract was added by amendment to
sidestep the ROFRs.187  A finding that Peters had convinced the town to
modify the terms of the original triggering offer in order to frustrate the
ROFR could establish a breach of Peters’s duty of good faith and fair deal-
ing.188  The court observed: “When a property owner and a potential
buyer attempt to circumvent another’s right of first refusal, the covenant
181. See id. at 831.
182. See id. at 833.
183. See id. at 833–38.
184. See supra notes 49–64 and accompanying text.
185. Smolian, 12 N.Y.S.3d at 840.
186. See id. at 840–41.  The court’s reasoning on the justiciable controversy
issue is not entirely convincing.  It appears that Peters and the town still wished to
proceed with their transaction, and the court’s rulings that the ROFRs were valid
and that the proposed sale to the town triggered the holders’ rights left open the
question whether the holders had to match the terms of the town’s offer.  Even
though the court determined that Peters had breached his contractual duty to give
notice to the holders of the triggering event, the holders obviously had notice of
the pending transaction by the time the cross-motions for summary judgment were
filed.  As a practical matter, it seems that a ruling on the matching question would
have resolved the balance of what was in fact an actual controversy.
187. See id. at 841.
188. See id.
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of good faith and fair dealing is breached.”189  The court commented that
the contract amendment adding the use restriction “apparently seeks to
ensure the sterilization of the properties,” and “could be seen to be an
attempt to potentially frustrate” or “to diminish” the ROFR.190  Note that
the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing is one of the first and
greatest cracks in the wall of formalism in contract interpretation.  In pref-
erential rights cases, courts regularly recognize this duty, often assigning
significant weight to it, and the trial court’s willingness to do so in the
Smolian case is hardly unusual.191  This observation serves as a reminder
that legal formalism does not completely dominate even the majority ap-
proach to contract interpretation under the contemporary cases.
Whether the court’s suspicions that Peters was acting in bad faith may
have been misplaced is an interesting question but of little importance for
present purposes.192
The interpretation issue before the court was whether the terms of
the ROFR left Peters free to decide that he would only sell to a buyer
willing to accept a use restriction.  At the conclusion of its analysis of Pe-
ters’s challenges to the validity of the ROFRs, in addressing a related
point, the court had already indicated a conventional approach to inter-
pretation.  Peters had asserted that a motivation for including the ROFRs
in the deeds conveying the properties to him in the first place was to give
members of the Smolian family, who also owned other property in the
189. See id. (citation omitted).
190. See id.
191. See, e.g., T.W. Nickerson, Inc. v. Fleet Nat’l Bank, 924 N.E.2d 696, 704–09
(Mass. 2010) (noting that trustee that held legal title to property did not violate
duty of good faith owed to tenant under lease that included option to renew and
ROFR); Brunswick Hills Racquet Club, Inc. v. Route 18 Shopping Ctr. Assocs., 864
A.2d 387, 399 (N.J. 2005) (landlord breached its duty of good faith through “a
demonstrable course of conduct, a series of evasions and delays, that lulled plain-
tiff into believing it had exercised the lease option properly”); FWT, Inc. v. Haskin
Wallace Mason Prop. Mgmt., L.L.P., 301 S.W.3d 787, 803 (Tex. App. 2009) (up-
holding summary judgment against ROFR holder on basis that grantor had met its
burden to show that condition in triggering offer “was commercially reasonable,
imposed in good faith, and not specifically designed to defeat” holder’s right).
192. Apparently, the court thought it especially significant that the original
contract with the town did not include the condition for the use restriction.
Smolian, 12 N.Y.S.3d at 840–42.  Peters and the town executed the sale contract on
May 22, 2014, the town board authorized the purchase on June 6, 2014, and in
September 2014, Peters and the town amended the contract to “acknowledge that
the Town is purchasing the subject premises with the express understanding that
the subject premises shall remain as open space” as authorized by certain Town
Board resolutions and a state enabling act. See id. at 830–31.  Aside from the tim-
ing of the amendment, the trial court’s opinion does not refer to any evidence or
even allegations about the town’s plans for the property or what the town board’s
resolution authorizing the purchase permitted the town to do with it.  Given that
the proposed sale was to a public entity that apparently had an established pro-
gram for purchasing property in the area for conservation purposes, the court’s
suspicions on this detail may have been unjustified.  According to the New York
Times account, the Town of East Hampton had been purchasing land in the area
for conservation purposes for two decades. See Chaban, supra note 3.
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area, the ability to prevent a future sale of the property for develop-
ment.193  Presumably, Peters thought that if he could prove this, the hold-
ers could not complain that his offer to sell included the use restriction.194
The court dismissed this claim, commenting that if the contracting parties
had intended to restrict the future use of the property, they could have
explicitly included language to that effect in the deeds.195  Fair enough,
although they also could have explicitly restricted Peters’s freedom to im-
pose use restrictions on any sale if they intended to immunize the preemp-
tive right from such conditions in the future.196  The ROFR language
quoted in the opinion does not suggest anything approaching the level of
comprehensive drafting discussed earlier in this Article.197
The central question, therefore, was not whether the original con-
tracting parties intended to preserve the property in its natural state but
whether, in the absence of any agreement on the point, Peters could con-
dition a triggering offer on such a severe use restriction.  The interpretive
dispute did not call on the court to decide what the parties actually in-
tended with respect to this unanticipated circumstance but how to deal
with the contractual gap.  On this issue, the court stated that “it would
appear that Peters cannot defeat the right of first refusal by eliminating
one of the more important sticks from the ‘bundle of sticks’ that consti-
tute the rights of ownership of real property, that is, the right to utilize the
property in keeping with the applicable zoning ordinances.”198  Appar-
ently, the court thought that, unless otherwise expressly limited, a right of
193. Smolian, 12 N.Y.S.3d at 839.
194. To be meaningful, however, Peters’s version of what motivated the par-
ties to the original transaction to include the ROFRs in the deeds would require
evidence that they intended that the ROFRs could only be exercised to prevent
development on the property.  Proving that a preservation objective might be one
of several reasons why the holders might want to exercise the preemptive right in
the future would not be sufficient.
195. See id. at 839.  The court offered this observation near the end of its
analysis of the ROFR’s validity, but the comment actually relates more directly to
the court’s interpretation of the ROFRs.
196. Even if the parties to the original transaction implicitly assumed that any
future sale of the property either could or could not be encumbered by a use
restriction, without the benefit of experienced real estate counsel, they would have
been unlikely to build that understanding into the language of the ROFR.
197. See supra notes 100–43 and accompanying text.  Presumably, only the
short provision quoted in the opinion was relevant, as the court introduced that
provision with the admonition that it is “important in such cases to examine the
language creating the right of first refusal.” Smolian, 12 N.Y.S.3d at 831.  The pro-
vision simply (1) stated that the conveyance was subject to a ROFR in favor of the
named members of the Smolian family so long as they owned certain identified
land, (2) specified a method for giving notice if Peters “received a bona fide offer,”
(3) gave the family members ten days after receiving the notice “to agree to
purchase the land upon the same terms and conditions as specified in the offer,” and (4)
provided for the ROFR to survive if the family members did not exercise the right
but the proposed sale to the third party failed to close within 120 days. See id. at
831–32 (emphasis added).
198. See id. at 842 (citations omitted).
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first refusal should be understood as a right to purchase fee simple title
unencumbered by this kind of use restriction.199
If the model proposed here for interpreting long-term preferential
rights agreements had applied in the Smolian case, factors beyond the lim-
ited language of the deeds could have tipped the scales a bit one way or
the other.  The point here is not that Peters should have prevailed, but
only that context, including the duration of the ROFRs, should have fac-
tored into the decision.  The conventional approach considers the dura-
tion of a preferential purchase right only in reference to the RAP and the
rule against illegal restraints on alienation, which concern the validity of
the right.  A long-term preemptive right, however, can impose a heavy bur-
den on marketability even though it does not restrain alienation in the
sense addressed by the common law rules concerning free alienability and
dead-hand control.  For Peters, the conventional rules of interpretation
invoked by the trial court may prevent him from selling his property on
terms acceptable to him until the last of the four holders named in his
deeds dies.200
The duration of the right, while not controlling, should be a factor a
court may consider when interpreting a preferential rights agreement.  In
interpreting the ROFRs in the Smolian case, for example, might it have
been important to inquire whether the use restriction in the town’s offer
to purchase was, under the circumstances prevailing in 2014, just as mate-
rial to the proposed deal as was the purchase price?  How likely is it that
the parties to the original transaction intended to limit the terms and con-
ditions upon which Peters could consider selling the property under the
unknowable circumstances the distant future would bring?  Should it have
been relevant to know whether the prospect of a sale to a public entity for
199. Perhaps the court’s explanation could be understood as a viable default
rule, but to create a default rule in such a circumstance would seem to sacrifice
logic for the sake of efficiency. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.  If,
however, the court was truly trying to discern what the contracting parties might
have intended had they considered the contingency, the interpretation is, by no
means, unreasonable.  The ROFRs operated as some kind of burden on Peters’s
fee title, and if he had simply imposed the use restriction on the property the
holders would have argued that the ROFRs, as prior matters of record, gave them
the right to purchase free of the subsequent restriction.  The actual case was in a
different posture because the use restriction, if not a ploy to frustrate the ROFRs,
could be seen simply as one of the terms of the triggering offer.  To conclude that
by accepting title subject to the ROFRs Peters gave up his right to negotiate the
terms of a future sale contradicts the express terms of the ROFR requiring the
holders to purchase on the terms and conditions of the triggering offer. See supra
note 193 and accompanying text.  In other words, the underlying question of inter-
pretation in the case remains whether the holders should have to accept whatever
conditions might be included (in good faith) in a triggering offer Peters was will-
ing to accept in the future.
200. In concluding that the ROFRs did not violate the RAP, the trial court
held that the language in the deeds created preemptive rights personal to the
named holders. See Smolian, 12 N.Y.S.3d at 838.
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preservation purposes might have been hard for the parties even to imag-
ine in 1992 and 1997?201
Although this Article is primarily interested in temporal considera-
tions, other contextual aspects could also be relevant to interpreting the
ROFRs in the Smolian case.  Why not consider whether Peters paid full
market price when he purchased the properties and therefore had every
reason to believe that he would remain free to sell the property for its full
market price or to accept a lower price in exchange for whatever
nonmonetary terms might serve his interests at the time?  Should it have
been important to know whether the price that the town offered to pay
was materially below the property’s market value if sold free of the use
restriction?202  Perhaps it would even have been fair to consider evidence,
if Peters actually had any, that a preservation motivation played some role
in the original transaction.203
The SKI case, in which the Vermont Supreme Court dealt with a
ROFO, provides an even stronger argument for a contextual model of in-
terpretation that gives some weight to the duration of a preferential
purchase right.204  The case involved not only a triggering offer that in-
cluded unique terms the parties did not anticipate when they negotiated
the agreement many years earlier, but it also arose in the aftermath of
significantly changed circumstances.
The original parties agreed to the ROFO in 1988 in connection with
the sale by SKI, Ltd. to Mountainside Properties, Inc. of thirty-three acres
within a much larger ski resort area.205  Mountainside was interested in
developing both the thirty-three-acre tract and an adjoining sixty-two-acre
site that SKI also owned (the ROFO property), however, development of
the ROFO property would have required offsite sewer treatment that was
not available at the time.206  SKI owned the local sewer treatment plant,
but it did not have capacity at the time sufficient to support development
on the ROFO property.  For that reason, rather than attempting to negoti-
ate a sale of the additional sixty-two acres immediately, the parties agreed
that if, in the future, SKI wished to sell the additional land, SKI would first
201. A contextual analysis might view a 2014 offer differently than the same
offer made much closer to the time the ROFRs were granted.  A sale on unique
terms that the parties likely did not contemplate might more strongly suggest viola-
tion of the duty of good faith and fair dealing if proposed relatively soon after
creation of the original transactions.
202. The New York Times article reports that Peters claimed that he could sell
the property to a developer for twice the price the town offered. See Chaban, supra
note 3.
203. See supra notes 189–92 and accompanying text.
204. See SKI, Ltd. v. Mountainside Props., Inc., 114 A.3d 1169, 1177–80 (Vt.
2015).
205. See id. at 1171.  The grantor in the original transaction actually was SKI’s
predecessor in title, but the two entities were affiliated.  For convenience, the text
treats the two as the same entity, as nothing of significance turns on the
distinction.
206. See id.
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offer the property to Mountainside, along with sewer treatment capacity.
Insofar as the opinion discloses, the terms of the ROFO agreement were
sparse and did not address the terms of a potential future offer except to
say that the offer would be at a market purchase price and that sewer treat-
ment would be at a to-be-specified capacity, both as determined by SKI at
the future time.207
In 2006, nearly twenty years after the original transaction, a proposed
sale of the ROFO property to Mountainside fell through.208  In 2007, SKI
sold the rest of the property it owned in the area, other than the ROFO
property, to three entities that took title as tenants in common (TICs).209
That sale included the sewer treatment facility, and SKI did not reserve
any rights to sewer treatment capacity for the ROFO property.  Subse-
quently, Mountainside opposed the TICs’ development plans; litigation
between Mountainside and the TICs eventually ensued and was pending
when the case between SKI and Mountainside went to trial.210  In 2012, in
an effort to complete the liquidation of its holdings in the area, SKI nego-
tiated with the TICs to provide sewer treatment for eight lots on the ROFO
property, contingent on a requirement, insisted upon by the TICs, that the
owner of the ROFO property would not oppose the TICs’ development
plans.211  SKI offered to sell the ROFO property to Mountainside, subject
to the no-contest condition.  Mountainside predictably found the condi-
tion unacceptable and argued that its preemptive right could not be sad-
dled with such a restriction.212
Particularly because of the time that had elapsed between the grant of
the ROFO and the eventual offer made to the holder, this situation cries
out for a contextual approach to contract interpretation.  What circum-
stances were involved in SKI’s decision to liquidate its real estate holdings
in the area?  Why did SKI sell the land that included the sewer treatment
facility but retain title to the ROFO property without reserving any sewer
treatment rights?  Was there a relationship between SKI and the TICs that
might suggest collusion to evade the ROFO?  What effect did the ROFO
have on the market value and marketability of the ROFO property, first in
1988, and then in the critical period of 2006–2012?  Over time, had the
ROFO property become practically unmarketable because of Mountain-
side’s aging preemptive right?213  Did any dealings among SKI, Mountain-
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See id. at 1172.
211. See id.
212. See id. at 1172–73.
213. After Mountainside rejected SKI’s offer, SKI successfully negotiated a
sale of the ROFO property at a higher price to another buyer who agreed to the
no-contest condition, but that sale was thwarted because SKI could not provide
title insurance to the buyer in light of the pending dispute with Mountainside. See
id. at 1173.
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side, and the TICs suggest whether SKI was acting in accordance with its
duty of good faith and fair dealing?
The court relied on traditional rules of contract interpretation, which
virtually foreclosed exploration of these questions, even though much in
the record indicated that the parties had addressed some of them during
the trial and the trial court had based its ruling on the question of SKI’s
good faith.214  When it insisted that the contract must “be enforced ac-
cording to contract principles,”215 the Vermont Supreme Court had in
mind a set of formal rules that apply generically to all contracts without
reference to the context in which any particular dispute arises.  Under this
approach to contract interpretation, the fact that twenty-four years after
the original deal was struck SKI no longer had control over the critical
sewer treatment capacity had “no bearing on what the parties intended at
the time they entered into the contract.”216  One could just as validly ar-
gue that the parties’ original failure to negotiate terms that would apply if
and when SKI no longer owned the sewer treatment plant had no bearing
on whether SKI should be able to offer the ROFO parcel on terms that
made economic sense when that state of affairs developed.  The court in-
voked a judicial restraint refrain: “We will not rewrite the contract, nor
graft conditions onto an unambiguous contractual provision merely be-
cause the passage of time and the course of development have led the
parties to positions they had not anticipated.”217
For reasons previously stated, the long duration of the ROFO in the
SKI case presents no policy reason to invalidate Mountainside’s preemp-
tive right, nor does it, when considered in isolation, mean that SKI should
have been able to impose the no-contest condition on its offer to Moun-
tainside.218  The long duration of the ROFO, however, unquestionably
contributed to a dispute that the original parties quite rationally did not
anticipate in their contract.  Was the court’s approach truly designed “to
give effect to the parties’ intent” as “reflected in the contract’s language,”
as the court insisted?219  Would it not have been more honest for the
court to decide openly, based on all of the relevant circumstances,
214. See id. at 1173–77.  On appeal, SKI claimed alternatively that Mountain-
side had failed to raise the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing at the trial
court level and that, even if the issue was raised, no evidence supported the trial
court’s finding that SKI had breached that implied duty. See id. at 1174.  By relying
on traditional rules of contract interpretation, the Vermont Supreme Court was
able to avoid addressing the issue. See id. at 1177.
215. See id. at 1176.
216. See id. at 1175.
217. See id. at 1175–76.
218. See supra notes 165–73 and the accompanying text.  Relying in part on
the Restatement, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s holding
that the ROFO imposed an illegal restraint on alienation. See SKI, 114 A.3d at
1177–80.  Despite the indefinite duration of the ROFO, SKI did not raise the RAP,
and the court expressed no opinion on that question. See id. at 1177 n.8.
219. See id. at 1175 (quoting R & G Props., Inc. v. Column Fin. Inc., 968 A.2d
286, 294 (Vt. 2008)).
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whether to imply an agreement by SKI not to relinquish control over the
sewer treatment plant for the life of the ROFO?220  This, of course, is pre-
cisely the dilemma that indefinite and incomplete contracts always pre-
sent.  When the parties’ written agreement does not contemplate the
circumstances that lead to a dispute, will justice best be served by applying
relatively inflexible rules of interpretation that disfavor a full considera-
tion of the particular context?  Or should courts develop principles of in-
terpretation that encourage a fuller development of the evidence related
to the dispute?
In both Smolian and SKI, a fully contextual approach might have ad-
vanced the property owner’s interpretation of the preferential rights
agreement over the holder’s interpretation.  But context, including tem-
poral aspects, can just as effectively support a holder’s interpretation in
favor of the preferential right.  The final case to be considered, Cornish
College of the Arts v. 1000 Virginia Ltd. Partnership,221 illustrates this point.
Cornish College of the Arts, as the subtenant of a portion of a build-
ing, held an option to purchase the entire building under an agreement
to which both the sublandlord and the fee owner were parties.222  The
option was at a $3,000,000 purchase price during an initial term of approx-
imately eighteen months, with a right to extend for an additional year at
the same purchase price in exchange for a $50,000 extension payment.223
The court allowed exercise of the option even though the college had
attempted to extend the option term without complying with the clear
requirements of the sublease and even though an unanticipated interven-
ing development radically changed the economics of the deal.224
The dispute began shortly after the deadline for extending the option
term passed.  Not only was the college a few days late in tendering the
extension fee, but its $50,000 check appeared to be invalid on its face for
lack of a required second signature.225  The sublandlord rejected the
tender and returned the check.  Nearly a year later, claiming that it had
properly extended the option period by its prior tender, the college at-
tempted to exercise the option and again tendered the $50,000 extension
220. If the contracting parties had expressly agreed to such a restriction,
would it have been unenforceable as an illegal restraint on alienation?
221. 242 P.3d 1 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010).
222. See id. at 5–6.  The opinion does not fully explain the underlying owner-
ship structure.  A portion of the property not covered by the sublease was involved
with a low-income housing tax credit program, and it appears that the sublan-
dlord, as an affiliate of the fee owner, may itself have leased the property, or part of
it, from the fee owner as part of a more complex arrangement related to the hous-
ing program. See id. at 6.  Because these details are not relevant to the aspects of
the case of interest in this Article, the text refers to the fee owner and the sublan-
dlord simply as the sublandlord.
223. See id.
224. See id. at 8–13.
225. See id. at 7.  “The check contained only one signature, despite language
on the check indicating that two signatures were required for amounts greater
than $7,500.” Id.
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fee, but the sublandlord again rejected the payment.226  Four months
later, the sublandlord gave notice of termination of the sublease pursuant
to a clause that gave either party the right to terminate early in the event
of substantial damage to the property, and the college moved out.227  The
college apparently did not challenge the termination notice at that time.
One of the most interesting aspects of the case is that a few months before
the college attempted to exercise the option, the sublandlord obtained an
appraisal estimating that the property had appreciated in value to
$7,700,000 due to a zoning change by the city of Seattle.228
The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision
that the college was entitled both to a grace period to extend the option
and to specific performance of the option, as well as to damages for
wrongful eviction.229  Instead of interpreting the clear language of the
sublease rigidly under traditional principles, the court adopted a broadly
contextual approach.  The primary considerations were that (1) the initial
tender of the extension payment was only a few days late, (2) the error was
inadvertent, (3) the subtenant had made substantial investments in the
property with the intention of exercising the option, and (4) the evidence
failed to show substantial prejudice to the sublandlord.230  The fourth
point is especially interesting in light of the unanticipated zoning change
that increased the property’s value.231  The court reasoned that if this was
prejudice to the sublandlord, it was not caused by the late tender of the
extension payment.232
The court rejected the sublandlord’s arguments that the college did
not act in good faith and did not come to court with the clean hands
equity requires and therefore should be strictly bound by the deadline.233
Indeed, several factors noted in the opinion, although not expressly cited
as a basis for the holding, emitted an aroma of bad faith on the sublan-
dlord’s part.  In particular, some peculiarities raised suspicions about the
sublandlord’s motivations for rejecting the initial tender of the extension
payment and for giving the early termination notice.  The evidence the
sublandlord presented to support its claim of “substantial destruction” of
the property was contradictory and was not based on a casualty event but
rather on a dubious claim about the general deterioration of the prop-
226. See id.
227. See id. at 7.
228. See id.
229. See id. at 8–16.  Because the subtenant sought specific performance of its
option rights, the court was able to rely on equitable principles to grant a grace
period for exercising the option.  Frustrated holders often seek specific perform-
ance of a preferential rights agreement, thereby opening the door to equitable
principles and making a contextual approach more feasible than in a standard
breach of contract action.
230. See id. at 9–11.
231. See id. at 7.
232. See id. at 10.
233. See id. at 8–11.
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erty.234  Additionally, the college introduced evidence that pre-existing ti-
tle encumbrances created by the sublandlord but not disclosed to the
college would have made it difficult for the sublandlord to convey clear
title in accordance with the requirements of the option.235  Finally, when
the sublandlord filed a bankruptcy petition after the trial court’s ruling,
the bankruptcy court denied a motion to reject the option agreement,
opining that the sublandlord’s motivation was to profit from the prop-
erty’s appreciation in value and holding that the bankruptcy filing “was a
litigation tactic rather than a bona fide effort to reorganize.”236
As noted, Cornish College is of interest in the first place because it
shows how a court can use context to relax the formal rules governing a
preferential purchase right.  Much authority supports the rule that the
holder must exercise an option strictly in accordance with the terms of the
agreement.237  The Washington court of appeals, however, was willing to
relax the formal standard in light of the full context in which the dispute
arose.  The case is also of interest because a question of interpretation not
addressed in the litigation lay just below the surface due to the dramatic
and unanticipated increase in the property’s value.  What about that 150%
increase in market value in less than two years?
Under the framework being proposed here, the fact that the parties
undoubtedly did not anticipate that the property’s value would appreciate
so much in such a short time could be a relevant factor.  But the very
nature of a contextual approach is that no single factor will be determina-
tive when the circumstances involve so many other potentially relevant as-
pects.  One especially critical consideration in the Cornish College case is
that the option to purchase arose out of a lease transaction and thus
should be interpreted in that context.  The Restatement concurs in this
view by deferring to landlord-tenant law with respect to preferential
purchase rights in leases to the extent it is inconsistent with the law of
servitudes.238  Even though in other contexts an option at a price that is
fixed for a relatively long duration is susceptible to challenge as an unrea-
sonable restraint on alienation, a tenant’s option to purchase is ordinarily
not treated as a restraint on the landlord’s right of alienation at all.239
234. See id. at 13–14.  The court did not decide whether there had been a
qualifying occurrence of substantial destruction for purposes of the early termina-
tion clause because the court held that the sublandlord’s notice of termination was
not timely. See id. at 14 n.13.
235. See id. at 6–7, 13.  The title issues arose because the portions of the prop-
erty not leased to the college were committed to the low-income housing program
for a period that extended until 2022. See id. at 6.
236. See id. at 14.
237. See, e.g., Casey v. Nat’l Info. Servs., Inc., 906 So. 2d 710, 719 (La. Ct. App.
2005); Elderkin v. Carroll, 941 A.2d 1127, 1136–37 (Md. 2008); Parker v. Booker,
822 N.Y.S.2d 156, 159–60 (App. Div. 2006); Foye v. Parker, 790 N.Y.S.2d 787, 788
(App. Div. 2005).
238. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 10, § 1.1(2)(a).
239. “A provision in the lease giving the tenant an option or a preemptive
right to purchase the leased property is not a restraint on alienation of the land-
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Even so, in the face of an unanticipated and highly favorable zoning
change, an out-of-time attempt to exercise an option under which the
purchase price is fixed for more than two years calls for thoughtful inter-
pretation of the terms of the option.  Nothing in the language of the sub-
lease suggested that a change in zoning or in market conditions should
affect the parties’ rights.  But certainly the parties never contemplated
such a rapid appreciation in value.  Would not a thoroughly contextual
approach to interpretation support an argument against enforcing the
fixed-price option under these circumstances?
Taking into account all of the circumstances, had the sublandlord
made this argument, a court applying a fully contextual approach proba-
bly would have been most heavily influenced by the evidence that the sub-
tenant had made significant capital investments in the property based on
an intention to exercise the option at the specified price.  The fact that the
option at the fixed price could be continued for an additional year in
exchange for a significant extension fee, as well as the many indications of
questionable motivations on the landlord’s part, would also have been rel-
evant.  Under the totality of the circumstances, the college would likely
have prevailed on the interpretation question, just as it did on the strict
compliance issue.240
The circumstances involved in the Smolian, SKI, and Cornish College
cases illustrate that the duration of a preferential right can be relevant
when a dispute involves the proper interpretation of the agreement creat-
ing the right.  In such cases, temporal considerations often can assist a
court in resolving disputes over interpretation in a logical and fair way, but
only if the court relaxes the relatively rigid rules that traditionally govern
interpretation of preferential rights agreements.  This is especially so when
a dispute involves an aging preemptive right, as in the Smolian and SKI
cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
The model proposed in this Article for interpreting long-term prefer-
ential purchase rights does not advance a general argument for a less for-
malistic, more contextual approach to contract interpretation.  Others
have written eloquently on that broad and important topic, and this Arti-
cle need not enter that debate writ large.241  To be sure, sound reasons
support adherence to formalism in interpreting contracts.  In particular,
the formal rules of contract interpretation serve the law’s interest in resolv-
lord’s interest in the leased property within the meaning of this section.” See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: LANDLORD & TENANT, supra note 91, § 15.2 cmt. a.
Note that a landlord that has granted the tenant an option to purchase can still sell
its fee interest, the value of which should reflect the economics of the lease and
option.
240. Perhaps the sublandlord bypassed this argument because it would have
undermined its insistence on a strict reading of the written agreement.
241. See supra notes 148–50 and accompanying text.
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ing disputes efficiently and discouraging reliance on evidence that is spec-
ulative or susceptible to manipulation.  But the relative merits of a
traditional and a more contextual approach may themselves vary with con-
text.  This is true even within the realm of real estate transactions.
Purchase and sale agreements, leases, and mortgages, for example, may be
relatively well-served by the conventional rules.  Preferential purchase
rights agreements are different.
This Article advances the modest proposition that in preferential
rights cases the principles governing interpretation should recognize the
significance of the context in which the dispute arises, including the tem-
poral aspects.  Several considerations show why this is so.  First, while long-
term preferential rights often serve the legitimate, immediate interests of
the contracting parties, they also can impose significant burdens on mar-
ketability, both in the sense relevant to a technical title examination and
in the more practical sense of commercial marketability.  These burdens
can outweigh the marginal social utility of long-term preferential rights.
Although an all-or-nothing bar, such as the RAP or the rule against illegal
restraints on alienation, is not justified, sound policy reasons recommend
affording these disputes close judicial scrutiny.  Second, the contracting
parties cannot anticipate every circumstance that may arise over a long
period.  Only sophisticated and well-represented parties even try to negoti-
ate and draft comprehensive terms, and many highly experienced real es-
tate lawyers concede that the goal is frustratingly elusive.  Third, the
expansive role that the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing often
plays in these cases has already opened the door to a more contextual
notion of contract.  These conditions, taken together, commend an ap-
proach that encourages the finder of fact to treat the duration of the right
and the amount of time that has passed as relevant considerations in dis-
putes over the proper interpretation of preferential rights, especially aging
preemptive rights.
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